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Abstract
This article discusses three credible attempts by African governments to restrict the jurisdic-
tion of  three similarly situated sub-regional courts in response to politically controversial 
rulings. In West Africa, when the Court of  the Economic Community of  West African States 
(ECOWAS) upheld allegations of  torture by opposition journalists in Gambia, that coun-
try’s political leaders sought to restrict the Court’s power to review human rights complaints. 
The other member states ultimately defeated Gambia’s proposal. In East Africa, Kenya failed 
in its efforts to eliminate the East African Court of  Justice (EACJ) and to remove some of  
its judges after a decision challenging an election to a sub-regional legislature. However, the 
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member states agreed to restructure the EACJ in ways that have significantly affected the 
Court’s subsequent trajectory. In Southern Africa, after the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal ruled in favour of  white farmers in disputes over land seizures, 
Zimbabwe prevailed upon SADC member states to suspend the Tribunal and strip its power to 
review complaints from private litigants. Variations in the mobilization efforts of  community 
secretariats, civil society groups and sub-regional parliaments explain why efforts to elimi-
nate the three courts or narrow their jurisdiction were defeated in ECOWAS, scaled back in 
the EACJ and largely succeeded in the SADC.
1 Introduction
Many scholars, journalists and attorneys express concern about backlashes against 
international courts. Upon investigation, most supposed examples of  backlash turn 
out to be little more than piqued criticisms, impassioned speeches or policy sugges-
tions that are never seriously pursued. In fact, the vast majority of  state-approved 
revisions of  international court-founding treaties have expanded the courts’ jurisdic-
tion and access rules rather than overturning disfavoured decisions or sanctioning 
judges. This article provides new evidence that is at odds with this sanguine account. 
We explore credible backlash threats against three similarly-situated international 
courts in Africa over the last decade. In all three instances, an African government 
responded to a politically controversial ruling by a sub-regional court with a formal 
sanction proposal – to eliminate the court, narrow its jurisdiction and access provi-
sions or augment the rules for disciplining its judges.
The outcomes of  these proposals were strikingly different, however. In West Africa, 
states rejected the Gambia’s effort to curb the Economic Community of  West African 
States (ECOWAS) Court’s broad access to private litigants in human rights cases. In 
East Africa, while Kenya failed to persuade neighbouring countries to eliminate the 
East African Court of  Justice (EACJ) or oust its Kenyan judges, it restricted the Court 
in other ways, creating an appellate division staffed with more conservative judges, 
approving strict time limits for filing complaints and adding rules for removing judges. 
In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe prevailed upon the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) member states to suspend the SADC Tribunal and its judges and 
later to strip the Court of  the power to review complaints from private litigants.
This article provides the first ever comparative documentation and analysis of  these 
three backlashes and their varied outcomes. We draw heavily on field research in West 
Africa in 2011, and in East and Southern Africa in 2013 and 2014, including over 50 
interviews and two workshops with government officials, human rights lawyers, bar 
associations, international and national judges and the staff  of  the secretariats of  the 
sub-regional communities. A review of  the Courts’ case law, non-governmental org-
anizations (NGO) press releases and news media reports provides additional context 
for our analysis.
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Our findings provide new evidence to explore theoretical debates relating to inter-
national courts, including whether international judges are independent of  states and 
the extent to which international adjudication is bounded by political constraints. 
Rationalist theories expect judges to anticipate and avoid negative political responses. 
The judges on all three recently created international courts could readily anticipate 
that their rulings would provoke a heated governmental reaction. Yet they issued their 
controversial rulings even when it was clear that governments stood ready to respond 
within court-curbing plans. What explains this audacious behaviour? Our answer 
emphasizes the judges’ awareness that non-state actors in the sub-regions – officials 
with community secretariats and lawyers associations, in particular – were likely to 
back the courts and mobilize in support of  their rulings. Variations in the extent and 
political influence of  this mobilization and in the independence and political power of  
civil society groups, on the one hand, and regional secretariats and parliaments, on 
the other, helps explain the divergent outcomes in each sub-region.
The second part of  this article describes the backlash attempts against the ECOWAS, 
the East African Community (EAC) and SADC courts. The third part distils the similari-
ties and differences across the three cases, arguing that relative state power, variations 
in institutional design and the subject matter of  each case triggering the backlash do 
not sufficiently explain the divergent outcomes. We show that consensus voting rules 
and political inertia make successful backlash efforts difficult to achieve, and, thus, 
extra-legal manoeuvring is key to changing the status quo. The fourth part analy-
ses how backlash efforts are derailed. We focus on the extent to which community 
secretariats, civil society groups and sub-regional parliaments can delay or thwart 
extra-legal strategies, buying time and creating opportunities for court supporters to 
mobilize. The fifth part concludes by briefly discussing other implications of  our find-
ings for the study of  international courts.
2 Backlashes against Three Sub-Regional Courts in Africa
This section explains the causes and consequences of  the three international court 
backlashes. The three courts are alike in several respects. Each is associated with a 
sub-regional integration community in which the primary goal of  economic liber-
alization is supplemented by a softer commitment to human rights and good gov-
ernance – a commitment that has generated most of  the cases decided by all three 
international courts. These communities include several common institutional fea-
tures: the adoption of  legally binding rules and collective decisions by consensus; a 
requirement to consult with civil society groups and, in principle at least, a commit-
ment to put common state and societal interests above the preferences of  any one 
government. Another similarity concerns the political and legal features of  each com-
munity’s member states. ECOWAS, the EAC and the SADC are each comprised of  a mix 
of  emerging or fragile democracies and authoritarian regimes. And all three include 
national legal systems with little tradition of  judicial independence and at least some 
countries where the rule of  law is fragile or illusory. Yet another commonality relates 
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to the design features of  each international court, in particular, the ability of  indi-
viduals and NGOs to file suits directly with the courts against member states alleging 
violations of  international law.
However, the three sub-regional courts are also hard cases for resisting a backlash. 
In comparison to Europe, the relatively small size of  each community should facili-
tate coordination to sanction judges or restrict a court’s jurisdiction and access rules. 
Moreover, many African nations have a tradition of  strong executive branches, weak 
judiciaries, citizens who share a deep post-colonial distrust of  external interference 
and, relatedly, a reluctance on the part of  political leaders to openly challenge the 
actions of  other African governments.
Since very little is known about these courts or the backlashes against them, our 
account is fairly detailed. We begin with a summary of  each community’s origins and 
institutions, identifying key similarities and differences across the three systems. We 
then describe the international court rulings that precipitated the backlash in each 
sub-region, including the government proposals to eliminate the courts or narrow 
their jurisdiction. We conclude by analysing the role of  governments, community sec-
retariats, civil society groups and the judges themselves in orchestrating or thwarting 
the backlash.
A The ECOWAS Court of  Justice: A Failed Backlash
The 2009 backlash against the ECOWAS Court stemmed from suits against the 
Gambia that fell squarely within the court’s human rights authority. A  2005 
Supplementary Protocol gives the ECOWAS Court broad jurisdiction over human 
rights suits.1 Private litigants from all 15 West African nations have direct access to 
the Court without the need to exhaust domestic remedies, a requirement imposed 
by most global and regional human rights systems. Among the first human rights 
suits to reach the ECOWAS Court were two complaints filed in 2007 by an NGO, the 
Media Foundation for West Africa, on behalf  of  Gambian journalists who had been 
detained and allegedly tortured for publishing news articles critical of  the govern-
ment.2 The Gambia has long been ruled by one of  the most repressive regimes in 
West Africa. Police and intelligence agents of  President Yahya Jammeh regularly 
harass independent and opposition media and exercise tight control over the coun-
try’s judges.3
1 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9, and 30 of  Protocol 
A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of  Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of  the English Version 
of  the Said Protocol (2005 Supplementary Protocol) (2005), available at http://www.courtecowas.org/
site2012/pdf_files/supplementary_protocol.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016), Arts 3, 4. For additional 
background on the origins of  the Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS) Court and the 
Protocol, see Alter, Helfer and McAllister, ‘A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The 
ECOWAS Community Court of  Justice’, 108 American Journal of  International Law (2013) 737.
2 ECOWAS Court, Manneh v. The Gambia, ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08, 5 June 2008; ECOWAS Court, Saidykhan 
v. The Gambia, ECW/CCJ/RUL/05/09, 30 June 2009.
3 US Department of  State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: The Gambia: Executive 
Summary (2013).
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Given this climate of  repression, the two ECOWAS suits provoked a hostile reaction. 
As one West African human rights lawyer explained, Jammeh had already ‘conquered 
his own judiciary,’ and he ‘refused to be bound by a court in Abuja’ (the seat of  the 
ECOWAS Court).4 The Gambia flatly ignored multiple requests to file documents or 
appear in court in the first suit by Chief  Ebrima Manneh. The government’s stone-
walling strategy backfired. In June 2008, the ECOWAS judges issued a carefully rea-
soned and evidence-rich decision finding the Gambia responsible for torture and other 
human rights abuses and ordering the government to release Manneh from detention 
and pay him US $100,000.5
The ECOWAS Court’s judgment in the Manneh case sent shock waves across West 
Africa. As the same human rights lawyer noted, ‘with a $100,000 fine, the embarrass-
ment was huge’.6 The case and the repression of  journalists that it exposed received 
widespread negative publicity. As one NGO press release explained, ‘[t]he Gambian 
media environment has long been hostile and dangerous, but the government’s fla-
grant disregard for the ECOWAS legal proceedings represents a low point’.7 Foreign 
governments and international organizations were equally damning and demanded 
that the Gambia fully comply with the Court’s judgment.8
The second suit, concerning the detention and torture of  Musa Saidykhan, was 
harder to ignore – the journalist was alive, exhibited clear signs of  torture and pur-
sued the case from the safety of  exile.9 The government responded to Saidykhan’s suit 
with a broadside of  legal and political arguments, including a claim that the suit was 
‘an affront to [Gambian] sovereignty’.10 The ECOWAS judges stood their ground. In 
June 2009, the Court published an interim ruling that considered and rejected each 
of  the government’s objections.11
Having failed to defeat Saidykhan’s suit with procedural objections, President 
Jammeh adopted a different strategy, working within ECOWAS to challenge the 
Court’s human rights jurisdiction. In September 2009, the Gambia submitted to the 
ECOWAS Commission – the sub-regional Secretariat – an official request to revise the 
2005 Supplementary Protocol.12 The request was accompanied by the text of  a draft 
Supplementary Act consisting of  six amendments to the ECOWAS Court’s powers:
4 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C by telephone (10 February 2011).
5 Manneh, supra note 2, paras 4, 28, 44.
6 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C by telephone (10 February 2011).
7 International Press Institute, ‘IPI Calls on the Gambian Government to Cooperate with ECOWAS 
Legal Proceedings’, Senegambia News (13 March 2008), available at http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200803170690.html (last visited 17 March 2016) (copy also on file with authors).
8 Rhodes, ‘Six Senators Call for Ebrima Manneh’s Immediate Release’, Committee to Protect Journalists 
(23 April 2009), available at https://cpj.org/blog/2009/04/six-senators-call-for-ebrima-mannehs-
immediate-rel.php (last visited 17 March 2016).  Linda Akrasi Kotey, ‘Ghana: Akoto Ampaw, Two Others 
in Gambia’, Ghanaian Chronicle (17 July 2009), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200907171086.
html (last visited 16 March 2016).
9 ‘ECOWAS Torture Case against the Gambia Nears an End’, Afrol News (22 September 2010), available at 
www.afrol.com/articles/36623 (last visited 16 March 2016).
10 Saidykhan, supra note 2, para 11.
11 Ibid., para 37.
12 2005 Supplementary Protocol, supra note 1.
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(a) that with respect to human rights cases, the Court should only have jurisdic-
tion in cases arising from international instruments ratified by the respondent 
country;
(b) also in human rights cases, the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction should be made sub-
ject to the exhaustion of  domestic remedies;
(c) cases should only be admissible if  instituted not later than 12 months after the 
exhaustion of  local remedies;
(d) cases should not be anonymous;
(e) the Court should not hear cases that are before other international mechanisms 
of  settlement;13 and
(f) to create an appeals procedure.14
On their face, these proposals appear relatively modest and uncontroversial. For the 
Media Foundation for West Africa and other human rights groups in the region, 
however, the true motivation for the proposals and their harmful consequences were 
immediately apparent.
According to a joint press release issued by 11 NGOs, the Gambia proposed the 
amendments to weaken the ECOWAS Court’s ‘capacity to deal effectively with tyran-
nical governments trampling on citizens’ rights’ and to ‘depriv[e] citizens of  free 
access’ to an ‘independent judicial instrument that is not usually available in many 
countries’ in a region ‘where the judiciary is an arm of  the executive’. The NGOs also 
characterized the attempt to limit the Court’s jurisdiction as a ploy to prevent the 
Court from hearing Saidykhan’s suit against the Gambia – one of  ‘the rare African 
countries which have not ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture’.15 
The press release urged the ECOWAS Commission to invite civil society groups to a 
proposed experts’ meeting that it had convened to review the Gambia’s proposals or to 
postpone the meeting ‘until there are broad consultations with representatives of  civil 
society organizations’.16
In fact, officials in the ECOWAS Commission’s Legal Affairs Directorate had already 
reached out to key lawyers and rights groups.17 To turn up the heat in advance of  
the meeting, two leading human rights organizations – the Registered Trustees of  
the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project and the Centre for Defence of  
Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, represented by the influential head of  the 
13 ‘West Africa: Country Submits Proposals to Amend ECOWAS Protocol’, FOROYAA Newspaper 
(Serrekunda, 25 September 2009), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200909250810.html (last 
visited 16 March 2016); see also N. Adu Ampofo, ‘Gambian Authorities Seek to Limit Reach of  Regional 
Human Rights Court’, Global Insight (28 September 2009).
14 A. Jallow, ‘Rights Groups Sue Gambia over Access to ECOWAS Court’, 30 September 2009, available at 
http://listserv.icors.org/scripts/wa-ICORS.exe?A2=ind0909E&L=gambia-l&F=&S=&P=11181 (last vis-
ited 16 March 2016).
15 International Freedom of  Expression Exchange, ‘Four IFEX Members, Civil Society Groups Fear Gambia 
Proposal Will Prevent ECOWAS Court from Ruling in Saidykhan Case’, 28 September 2009, available at 
www.ifex.org/west_africa/2009/09/28/ecowas_court_jurisdiction/ (last visited 16 March 2016).
16 Ibid.
17 Interviews with Human Rights Advocates B (3 February 2011) and C by telephone (10 February 2011); 
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A in Abuja, Nigeria (7 March 2011).
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West African Bar Association, Femi Falana, filed an ex parte motion with the ECOWAS 
Court seeking an emergency order ‘to stop the Government of  Gambia and the 
ECOWAS Commission from amending the laws concerning the jurisdiction and access 
to’ the Court.18 The suit, publicized in the news media, challenged the legality of  the 
Gambian proposals on multiple grounds. It also tied the proposals to the Gambia’s 
refusal to comply with the Manneh judgment.19
Two days later, legal experts from across West Africa gathered in the Nigerian 
capital to consider the proposals. Although accounts of  the meeting differ on some 
details, all sources agree that an ECOWAS Committee of  Legal Experts decisively rec-
ommended against narrowing the Court’s human rights powers.20 One week later, 
the Council of  Justice Ministers endorsed the legal experts’ recommendation. Their 
decision effectively shelved the proposals.21 The Gambia could have sought a further 
review before the Council of  Justice Ministers, but the government at this point aban-
doned its campaign to sanction the Court.
The Gambian backlash provided a clear opportunity for West African govern-
ments to reconsider the ECOWAS Court’s expansive human rights jurisdiction and 
access rules. Their decision to decisively reject the Gambian challenge is striking. One 
ex planation was the widely shared perception of  the Gambia as a bad actor with lim-
ited political clout in ECOWAS. However, the defeat would not have occurred without 
the extensive mobilization efforts of  human rights NGOs and attorneys. By issuing 
press releases, filing an emergency suit and demanding access to a key meeting, these 
actors ensured that the Gambia’s campaign was well publicized, that consultation 
procedures were followed and that their voices would be heard when experts convened 
to discuss the proposals.22
Equally essential was the overt and tacit support of  individuals within the ECOWAS 
Commission. The Commission had recently blessed the member states’ decision to pro-
visionally delegate capacious human rights authority to the then-inactive ECOWAS 
Court. The judges had just begun to exercise this authority, and one of  their judg-
ments – against Niger for condoning modern forms of  slavery – received widespread 
recognition and praise, including in the foreign media.23 In addition, West African 
18 Jallow, supra note 14. The complaint was apparently withdrawn after the defeat of  the Gambia’s proposals.
19 I. Anaba, ‘SERAP, CHRDA Challenge Plans to Amend ECOWAS’ Court Powers’, Vanguard (Nigeria, 26 
June 2008).
20 Interview with Human Rights Advocate C by telephone (10 February 2011); Interview with Human 
Rights Advocate A  by telephone (11 January 2011); M.  Nyang, ‘Amendment [sic] to ECOWAS Court 
Mandate: Gambia Isolated By State Parties’, 30 September 2009, available at http://listserv.icors.org/
scripts/wa-ICORS.exe?A2=ind0910A&L=gambia-l&F=&S=&P=76 (last visited 16 March 2016).
21 Sources disagree as to whether the justice ministers rejected the Gambian proposal unanimously, 
defeated it by a 9–6 vote or whether the government withdrew the proposal. See Media Foundation for 
West Africa, Press Statement: Justice Ministers Endorse Experts’ Decision, 14 October 2009, available 
at www.ifex.org/west_africa/2009/10/14/gambian_proposal_defeated/ (last visited 16 March 2016); 
Interview with Human Rights Advocate A  by telephone (11 January 2011); Interview with Human 
Rights Advocate C by telephone (10 February 2011).
22 Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A in Abuja, Nigeria (7 March 2011).
23 ECOWAS Court, Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07, 27 October 2008; see also 
L. Polgreen, ‘Court Rules Niger Failed by Allowing Girl’s Slavery’, New York Times (28 October 2008), at A6.
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governments had doubled down on their support of  the Court in 2006 by creating a 
Judicial Council to screen applications for open judgeships and recommend a slate of  
the best qualified candidates to the member states.24 To impose additional hurdles to 
private litigants suits just as the Court was beginning to hear cases would have under-
cut these political and institutional investments in the community’s fledgling judicial 
body – an outcome that Commission officials disfavoured.25
Since the rejection of  its proposals, the Gambia has continued to flout the ECOWAS 
Court’s 2007 decision in the Manneh case and its 2010 judgment in favour of  the sec-
ond journalist, Musa Saidykhan.26 However, the defeat of  the government’s campaign 
had the opposite of  its intended goal. The Court has continued to develop its human 
rights jurisprudence, albeit in a manner suggesting its awareness of  the political limits 
of  its authority and the serious obstacles to securing compliance with its judgments. 
The judges have condemned clear human rights abuses while rejecting litigant pleas 
to construe its jurisdiction expansively and using public speeches to urge governments 
to comply with its judgments.27
The Court has pursued these actions notwithstanding a multi-year delay in judicial 
appointments, during which time the existing judges remained in office and continued 
to hear cases.28 With the swearing in of  a new slate of  seven judges recommended by 
the Judicial Council in 2014,29 the ECOWAS Court’s formal human rights authority 
now rests on a more solid legal and political foundation.
B The EACJ: A Backlash Redirected
The current EAC is a revival of  an earlier EAC that operated from 1967 to 1977 and 
consolidated colonial era regional institutions dating back to 1917. The re-establish-
ment of  the EAC in 1999 reflected a renewed commitment to sub-regional integration 
and cooperation that involves not only states but also the private sector and peoples of  
East Africa. The EAC’s judicial arm has a similar historical legacy. The EACJ replaced 
24 Decision A/Dec.2/06/06 Establishing the Judicial Council of  the Community, adopted 14 June 2006. 
The Council comprises the presidents and chief  justices from member states not then represented on the 
seven-member ECOWAS Court.
25 Interview with a legal adviser at the ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate in Abuja, Nigeria (7 March 2011).
26 In 2010, the ECOWAS Court issued a judgment holding the Gambia responsible for illegally detaining 
and torturing Saidykhan and awarding him damages of  US $200,000. ECOWAS Court, Saidykhan v. The 
Gambia, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07, 16 December 2010, para. 47. In 2011, the Gambia denied 
responsibility for Manneh’s death and asked the court to set aside both judgments on the ground that the 
judges failed to properly assess the evidence. In 2012, the Court rejected the Gambia’s arguments and 
reaffirmed the judgments. The USA, the United Kingdom and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
continue to push for compliance in country reports and before United Nations human rights bodies.
27 See Alter, Helfer and McAllister, supra note 1, at 766–768.
28 Protocol A/P.l/7/91: On the Community Court of  Justice Protocol A/P.l/7/91 on the Community Court 
of  Justice (1991), available at http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/protocol.pdf  (last visited 
16 March 2016),Art. 4(3) provides: ‘At the expiration of  the term of  a member of  the Court, the said 
member shall remain in office until the appointment and assumption of  office of  his successor.’
29 ECOWAS, Judicial Council Endorses Recruitment of  7 Judges for ECOWAS Court of  Justice, Press Release 
No. 051/2014, 21 March 2014.
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the East African Court of  Appeal, which closed down in 1977 with the collapse of  the 
earlier EAC. While the EACJ, launched in 2001, is sometimes confused with its precur-
sor, it is an international court charged with interpreting and applying EAC treaties 
and other community legal texts.30
The most controversial aspect of  the EACJ’s jurisdiction concerns human rights.31 
Unlike the ECOWAS Court, which has an express mandate to hear human rights suits, 
and the SADC Tribunal, which interprets a sub-regional treaty that arguably includes 
human rights commitments, the EAC Treaty explicitly states that the EACJ shall have 
a human rights jurisdiction ‘as will be determined by the [EAC] Council at a suit-
able subsequent date’ once member states ‘conclude a protocol to operationalise the 
extended jurisdiction’.32
EAC member states have not adopted such a protocol, yet human rights cases com-
prise most of  the EACJ’s docket.33 This paradox is the result of  sustained advocacy by 
human rights lawyers in East Africa, who have urged the Court to adjudicate viola-
tions of  the rule of  law, social justice and human rights in the EAC Treaty’s objectives 
and fundamental principles clauses, even in the absence of  the protocol’s adoption.34 
EAC member states have repeatedly contested the EACJ’s jurisdiction to entertain 
these suits. Yet the Court, while acknowledging that it is not a human rights tribunal 
as such, has repeatedly asserted its power to interpret EAC legal instruments relating 
to human rights.
The case that provoked a backlash did not, however, involve human rights. In its 
first ruling under its contentious jurisdiction,35 the EACJ rejected the slate of  candi-
dates chosen by Kenya to sit in the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). The legal 
issue concerned Article 50 of  the EAC Treaty, which requires an election for seats in 
the EALA.36 Instead, the Kenyan government divided the seats among the country’s 
political parties in proportion to their strength in the national Parliament – a move 
that the opposition party viewed as an attempt to control the domestic legislative 
agenda and renege on promises to share power.37
30 Treaty for the Establishment of  the East African Community (EAC Treaty) 1999, 2144 UNTS 255, Art. 
27(1).
31 See Gathii, ‘Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of  Justice’s Human Rights 
Strategy’, 24 Duke Journal of  Comparative and International Law (2014) 249.
32 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 27(2).
33 Decisions of  the East African Court of  Justice (EACJ), available at http://eacj.org/?page_Ibid=2414 
(last visited 16 March 2016). Many complainants to the EACJ seek preliminary injunctive relief; thus, 
a majority of  the court’s rulings are interim decisions. The EACJ website indicates that the Court had 
issued 53 final judgments as of  November 2015. The total tally of  all final judgments, interim decisions, 
interlocutory appeals and tax and cost rulings issued as of  the same date is 113.
34 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 6(d) (fundamental principles), Art. 7(2) (operational principles).
35 EACJ, Anyang Nyong’o v.  Attorney General of  Kenya, Reference No. 1 of  2006, 27 November 2006, 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/EACJ_rulling_on_injunction_ref_
No1_2006.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016).
36 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 50  ‘stipulates that the elected members shall, as much as feasible, be 
representative of  specified groups, and sets out the qualifications for election’.
37 Nyong’o, supra note 35, at 2–5.
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Opposition politicians turned to the EACJ hoping to inflict an embarrassing loss 
on the governing party in the lead up to national elections. The key event triggering 
the backlash against the Court was an interim ruling in Anyang Nyong’o v. Attorney 
General of  Kenya that barred EAC officials from recognizing Kenya’s slate of  EALA 
nominees until the Court had decided the case on its merits. The ruling incensed the 
Kenyan government, triggering a campaign to kill the sub-regional court and exert 
greater control over its judges. We highlight those aspects of  the dispute that are rel-
evant to the Kenyan backlash and the responses by other EAC member states, civil 
society groups, the EAC Secretariat and the EALA.38
The EACJ’s interim ruling is noteworthy for its unvarnished conclusion that Kenya 
had breached the EAC Treaty by holding a ‘fictitious election in lieu of  a real election’ 
and for the issuance of  an interim injunction that delayed the EALA’s second session 
by more than six months.39 Two aspects of  the ruling especially vexed the govern-
ment. First, Kenya viewed the decision as unwelcome external interference in a sensi-
tive domestic political dispute and, even worse, as taking the opposition’s side. Kenya’s 
president went so far as to label the EACJ’s ruling as undermining the country’s sov-
ereignty.40 Second, Kenya objected to the Court’s conclusion that its interpretation of  
the EAC Treaty binds national courts and that the standing and exhaustion of  domes-
tic remedies doctrines did not bar the Court from hearing suits from private litigants.41
Kenya’s reaction to the Nyong’o ruling was swift and furious. Officials pursued sev-
eral lines of  attack more or less simultaneously. When one avenue was thwarted, the 
government pushed ahead with other strategies, ultimately succeeding in rushing 
through amendments to the EAC Treaty that curbed the EACJ’s authority. Kenya’s first 
move, led by Attorney General Amos Wako just days after the Court’s interim injunc-
tion, was a behind-the-scenes effort to kill the fledgling court.42 The proposal was not 
sympathetically received by Uganda and Tanzania,43 which supported the East African 
integration project and resisted regionalizing Kenya’s domestic political squabbles.44 
Tanzanian officials viewed the proposal as ‘too extreme’,45 while President Museveni 
of  Uganda – who hoped to become the EAC’s president should the EAC become a 
38 A blow-by-blow account of  the lengthy and complex Nyong’o litigation is beyond the scope of  this article. 
For a comprehensive analysis, see Gathii, supra note 31, at 265–271.
39 Nyong’o, supra note 35, at 43; Interview with Judge C of  the EACJ First Instance Division, Nairobi, Kenya 
(2 August 2013) (asserting that the EACJ was aware that the Nyong’o ruling would delay the East African 
Legislative Assembly’s [EALA] opening).
40 Speech delivered by Kenyan President Kibaki, 8th EAC Summit, Arusha Tanzania, 30 November 2006, 
available at www.jaluo.com/wangwach/1206/Leo_Odera_Omolo120106a.html (last visited 16 March 
2016) (noting that the ‘ruling of  the Court poses serious challenges to the East African Community’ and 
that the ‘Council of  Ministers is well seized of  these challenges and their grave implications’).
41 Nyong’o, supra note 35, at 20.
42 Individuals with first-hand knowledge described the government’s plans in off-the-record interviews.
43 Tanzania and Uganda were the only other member states of  the East African Community (EAC) at the 
time. Rwanda and Burundi did not join the EAC until several years later.
44 G. Warigi, ‘Our Free Wheeling Politics May Frustrate Regional Unity’, Daily Nation (3 December 
2006) available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200612040362.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
45 Interview with Human Rights Advocate L, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
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political federation – shared with Tanzania an aversion to actions that could contrib-
ute to the collapse of  the EAC. Blocked in its efforts to kill the Court, Kenya turned to 
a strategy that it could implement unilaterally – threatening to oust the EACJ’s two 
Kenyan judges, one of  whom was the Court’s president. By removing the judges from 
the Nyong’o case, the government hoped to avoid an adverse ruling on the merits that 
would solidify the opposition’s influence in the EALA.
During a status conference at the Court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania, a high-level 
legal team led by Kenya’s solicitor general visited the EACJ president’s chambers. The 
attorneys urged the president and his Kenyan colleague to recuse themselves from the 
Nyong’o case. If  they did not, the solicitor general threatened to file a formal recusal 
motion asserting that the two jurists had engaged in ‘corruption, unethical practice, 
and absence of  integrity’ in the performance of  their judicial offices in Kenya.46 (Many 
EACJ judges continue to serve as national judges while serving on the sub-regional 
court, which is not a full-time judicial body.)
Refusing to accede to pressure tactics that the EACJ later described as ‘akin to 
intimidation’47 and an ‘ambush’,48 the Kenyan jurists sought the advice of  their 
colleagues, who unanimously backed them. At the public hearing on the recusal 
motion, the government made good on its threat to ‘wash the dirty laundry’ of  the 
Kenyan judges.49 It argued that because the judges had been suspended from their 
duties on the Kenyan courts due to allegations of  corruption, they could not render 
a fair judgment in the Nyong’o case.50 In the end, it was the government that was 
embarrassed. Kenya withdrew its complaint against one of  the judges who had vol-
untarily resigned from his national judicial post after the government commended 
him for his service and wished him a ‘prosperous time in the EACJ’.51 Caught in its 
own inconsistency, the government apologized.52 As for the second judge, the EACJ 
found no basis to question his impartiality. A Kenyan court later found that the cor-
ruption investigation violated that judge’s ‘natural justice rights’ and ordered his 
reinstatement.53
Undaunted by its inability to oust the Kenyan judges, the government pursued 
a third approach – amending the EAC Treaty. Kenya’s treaty revision proposal had 
46 EACJ, Attorney Gen. of  Kenya v. Nyong’o, Application No. 5 of  2007, 6 February 2007, at 19; see also 
‘Kibaki Rails at EAC Court as Rwanda, Burundi Join Up’, The East African (4 December 2006), available 
at www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/252342/-/t6awg5z/-/index.html (last visited 16 March 
2016).
47 Nyong’o, supra note 46, at 11.
48 Ibid., at 8–9; Interview with EACJ Appellate Judges A and B, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
49 Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge A and President, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
50 Nyong’o, supra note 46, at 8.
51 Ibid., at 11, 14.
52 Ibid., at 12.
53 Republic v. Chief  Justice of  Kenya and Others Ex Parte Moijo Ole Keiwua (2010) eKLR. On the reinstatement, 
see P. Kameri Mbote and M. Aketch, Kenya: Justice Sector and the Rule of  Law: A Review by AfriMAP 
and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa (March 2011), at 111; M. Mati, ‘Kenya is Guilty of  
Judicial Interference’, The East African (26 February 2007), available at www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
opOrEd/-/434748/253402/-/rbk891z/-/index.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
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several objectives: to pressure the judges to avoid further adverse rulings in the 
Nyong’o case, to restrict the Court’s ability to hear cases from private litigants, to estab-
lish an appellate chamber staffed by pro-government jurists and to create a procedure 
to remove judges for misconduct.54 The East African Law Society (EALS) denounced 
these proposals as a brazen and illegal ploy ‘to threaten and cow down the Court’55 
and intimidate its judges.56
The amendments were proposed, drafted and adopted with exceptional haste, 
circumventing the EAC’s institutional processes that opponents might have used to 
block or weaken the proposals. On 28 November 2006 – one day after the Nyong’o 
injunction – the EAC Council of  Ministers called for a study of  the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Two days later, the three EAC presidents endorsed the Council’s recommendations to 
reconstitute the EACJ as a two-level court with First Instance and Appellate Divisions, 
to expand the procedures for removing judges from office and to convene a special 
summit to adopt these changes as amendments to the EAC Treaty.57
On 7 December 2006, Kenyan Attorney General Wako chaired a meeting of  EAC 
attorneys general to finalize draft amendments to the EAC Treaty that Wako himself  
had prepared.58 The very next day, the Council of  Ministers convened an extraordi-
nary meeting to approve the draft amendments.59 Uganda adopted the amendments 
on 11 December, Tanzania the next day and Kenya the day after. The summit endorsed 
the amendments on 14 December 2006 on the sidelines of  a non-EAC meeting,60 and 
they entered into force in May 2007.61
The amendments substantially changed the EACJ’s structure, jurisdiction and 
access rules. They split the Court into two divisions; provided rules for appeals to the 
Appellate Division; added new grounds for removing or suspending EACJ judges due 
to allegations of  ‘misconduct’ in their home countries; clarified that the Court had no 
power to review cases for which ‘jurisdiction [is] conferred by the Treaty on organs 
of  Partner States’ and added a two-month time limit for private litigants to file com-
plaints challenging national actions or decisions that are contrary to the Treaty.62
54 Onoria, ‘Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial Independence in the East African 
Community’, 54 Journal of  African Law (2010) 74, at 84.
55 EACJ, East African Law Society and 4 others v. Attorney General of  Kenya and 3 others, Reference No. 3 of  
2007, 30 August 2008; see also East African Law Society (EALS), No Integration without the Rule of  
Law, Press Release, 4 December 2006, at 2 (describing attempts ‘to intimidate and bully the Court’).
56 East African Law Society, supra note 55. See also ‘Wagging Tongues over EALA Ruling Is Contempt of  
Court’, Arusha Times (10–15 December 2006), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200612110956.
html (last visited 16 March 2016).
57 Communique of  the Summit of  the EAC Summit, 30 November 2006.
58 See Report of  the Extraordinary Meeting of  the Attorneys General on the Proposed Amendment of  the 
Treaty for the Establishment of  the East African Community, Reference EAC/AG/EX/2006, 7 December 
2006, para. 2.0.
59 Report of  the Extraordinary Meeting of  the Council of  EAC Ministers, 7–8 December 2006.
60 ‘East Africa: Irate Kibaki Clips the Wings of  EACJ Judges’, The East African (19 December 2006), available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200612190758.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
61 Onoria, supra note 54, at 82, n. 49.
62 EAC Treaty (revised), supra note 30, Arts. 26(1), 26(2), 27(1), 30(2).
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The adoption of  the amendments triggered a vociferous reaction from civil soci-
ety groups, opposition politicians and the plaintiffs in the Nyong’o case, all of  whom 
focused on the member states’ circumvention of  sub-regional and national rules and 
procedures. The EALS protested the exclusion of  NGOs from the EAC-level amend-
ment process.63 Kenyan legislators protested the adoption of  the amendments by 
executive decree. 64 The Nyong’o plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the amendments 
in a domestic suit before the High Court of  Kenya.65 And academic commentators 
characterized the amendments as an attempt to weaken the EACJ.66
These contestations soon reached the EACJ when the EALS challenged the amend-
ment’s adoption.67 In an August 2008 decision, the Court agreed with the Law 
Society that the amendments were procedurally defective because the member states 
had not allowed the private sector and civil society to participate in their drafting.68 
The EACJ also categorically rejected as a ‘veiled intimidation’ Kenya’s allegation that 
‘the hurried process [of  adoption] was necessitated by the loss of  public confidence in 
the court’.69 Yet the Court refrained from invalidating the amendments because the 
‘infringement was not a conscious one’, the violation was ‘not likely to recur’ and ‘not 
all the resultant amendments are incompatible with Treaty objectives’.70 The decision 
can thus be viewed as a rhetorical judicial pushback but a substantive acquiescence 
to a political fait accompli.
Kenya’s efforts to overturn the EACJ’s edicts in the Nyong’o case were less successful, 
however. In March 2007, the Court confirmed its interim injunction against swear-
ing in the Kenyan EALA members and ordered Kenya to conduct elections consistent 
with the EAC Treaty.71 The government sought to evade the judgment by lobbying 
Uganda and Tanzania, but the two states stood behind the EACJ. President Museveni 
of  Uganda even sent emissaries to the Kenyan leaders, urging them to put their politi-
cal house in order to avoid impeding the EAC integration agenda.72 Lacking the sup-
port of  the other governments, Kenya finally capitulated. In May 2007, the Kenyan 
63 See People’s Daily Online, 16 December 2006, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200612/16/
print20061216_333151.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
64 Kenya Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly (Hansard), 16 May 2007, at 1339–1429, available 
at http://info.mzalendo.com/hansard/sitting/national_assembly/2007-05-16-09-00-00 (last visited 16 
March 2016).
65 Nairobi High Court, Anyang Nyong’o and 10 Others v. AG, Civil Case No. 49, 2006, available at http://
kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/37525 (last visited 16 March 2016).
66 Onoria, supra note 54, at 83–94; A. Pieter van der Mei, The East African Community: The Bumpy Road 
to Supranationalism, Maastricht Faculty of  Law Working Paper 2009-7 (2009), at 12.
67 EALS, supra note 55.
68 Ibid., at 13–14.
69 Nyong’o, supra note 46, at 11
70 EALS, supra note 55, at 43–44.
71 Nyong’o, supra note 35 at 36.
72 N. Nyamboga, ‘East Africa: Partner States Decline to Support Kenya’s Plea’, East African Standard 
(Nairobi, 9 May 2007), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200705081068.html (last visited 16 
March 2016).
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Parliament revised the rules for EALA membership and held fresh elections conform-
ing to the Court’s interpretation of  the EAC Treaty.73
Although the EACJ survived Kenya’s backlash campaign, the amendments to the 
EAC Treaty have altered its subsequent evolution. The two-month time limit for filing 
cases has presented challenges for lawyers, and the Appellate Division has reversed 
some of  the First Instance Division’s more expansive rulings. Yet both the chambers 
have adjudicated a broad range of  legal issues covered by the EAC Treaty – in particu-
lar, suits alleging human rights violations. The EACJ’s review of  human rights suits is 
by far the most important post-Nyong’o development. In Katabazi v. Secretary General 
of  the EAC, the EACJ held that it would not ‘abdicate’ jurisdiction over human rights 
complaints framed as breaches of  the EAC Treaty’s fundamental principles.74 This was 
a strikingly bold conclusion given the Treaty’s explicit statement that the member 
states would confer such jurisdiction via a yet-to-be-adopted protocol.75
A series of  human rights decisions have followed Katabazi, many of  which have been 
filed by, or have the support of, the EALS. Both chambers of  the EACJ have endorsed 
Katazabi’s core holding, but the First Instance Division has been more permissive to 
private litigants, applying a continuing violations doctrine to circumvent the amend-
ment’s very short two-month window for challenging national policies and decisions 
that are contrary to the EAC Treaty.76 In contrast, the Appellate Division has strictly 
construed this provision, enabling governments to defeat several suits raising credible 
allegations of  human rights violations.77
C The SADC Tribunal: A Successful Backlash
Unlike its sub-regional cousins, whose integration projects have roots in the immedi-
ate post-independence period, the SADC is a more recent institution. When govern-
ments launched the SADC in the early 1990s, they solicited financial support from 
European governments. To make such assistance more enticing, the sub-region’s 
political leaders decided to ‘visibly emulate’ the supranational ‘EC-style common mar-
ket model’ without, however, giving much thought to its ‘advantages and disadvan-
tages’.78 Thus, the emulation was in tension with the member states’ desire to ‘retain[] 
a more sovereignty-preserving institution “in practice”.’79
73 East African Community (Election of  Members of  Assembly) Rules, 2007, adopted by the Parliament of  
Kenya, 23 May 2007. Elections under these rules were held on 29 May 2007. Election of  Members of  the 
EALA, Kenya Gazetter Notice No. 4873, vol. 109, No. 37, 31 May 2007.
74 EACJ, Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of  the E. African Cmty, Reference No. 1 of  2007, 1 November 2007, at 1–2.
75 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 27(2).
76 E.g., Independent Medical Unit v. Attorney General of  Kenya, Reference No. 3 of  2010 (1st Inst. Div.), 29 June 
2011.
77 EACJ, Omar Awadh and 6 Others v. Attorney General of  Uganda, Appeal No. 2 of  2012 (App. Div.), 15 April 
2013, at 15.
78 Lenz, ‘Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC’, 35(1) West European 
Politics (2011) 155, 163.
79 Ibid., at 166; see also Nathan, ‘The Disbanding of  the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale’, 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly (2013) 870, 876–877.
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The 1991 SADC Treaty envisioned that a tribunal would be created by a separate 
protocol.80 In the late 1990s, after the SADC’s membership expanded to include five 
more countries, including South Africa,81 the member states considered whether 
to adopt the protocol. Several governments voiced a preference for arbitration and 
mediation, but European donors expressed doubt that the SADC could advance sub-
regional integration without a more ‘effective and credible’ dispute settlement mech-
anism.82 Partly in response to this external pressure, the SADC Protocol’s drafters 
– who included a British judge funded by the European Community – created a tribu-
nal modelled on the European Court of  Justice, with direct access for private litigants 
(after exhausting domestic remedies) and a preliminary ruling mechanism.83
The new Tribunal’s fate soon became inextricably linked to its first major case, filed 
in 2007 by Michael Campbell, a white landowner from Zimbabwe.84 The case was 
highly controversial, Campbell was a tenacious litigant, his attorneys were creative 
and aggressive and the suit challenged the signature land redistribution program of  
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe – a former rebel leader lionized across the region 
for overthrowing white minority rule, but who is also one of  Africa’s most autocratic 
political leaders.
In post-independence Zimbabwe, the best land remained in the hands of  a small 
number of  white farmers. The government initially followed a ‘willing seller, willing 
buyer’ approach to land reform, but later began to forcibly expropriate white-owned 
landholdings.85 In 2006, the government notified Campbell that it intended to seize 
his farm. Campbell challenged the decision before the Zimbabwean Supreme Court.86 
He also filed an application with the SADC Tribunal, alleging discrimination on the 
basis of  race, lack of  due process in the deprivation of  property and denial of  access 
to the courts.87
Over the next several years, the SADC judges issued a series of  audacious interim 
rulings, judgments and contempt orders in favour of  Campbell and 77 other white 
80 Treaty of  the Southern African Development Community (SADC Treaty), available at http://www.sadc.
int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016), Art. 16.
81 The original Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states were Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mauritius, 
the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, the Seychelles, South Africa and Madagascar joined the SADC 
between 1995 and 2006.
82 Lenz, supra note 78, at 166.
83 Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of  the South African Development Community (SADC Protocol), avail-
able at www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf  
(last visited 16 March 2016), Arts 15, 16.
84 SADC Tribunal, Campbell and Others v.  Zimbabwe (Merits), Case No. SADC (T) 2/2007, 28 November 
2008, at 4 (complaint filed 11 October 2007).
85 Moyo, ‘Land Reform and Redistribution in Zimbabwe since 1980’, in S. Moyo and W. Chambati (eds), Land 
and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Capitalism (2013) 29.
86 Minister of  National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement, Constitutional Application 
No. 124/06, Judgment No. SC 49/07, 22 January 2008, at 2, available at www.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/
supreme-court/2008/1 (last visited 16 March 2016).
87 See Campbell, supra note 84, at 16–17.
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farmers whose suits were joined to his case.88 In November 2007, the Tribunal issued 
a preliminary injunction preventing Zimbabwe from evicting Campbell or interfering 
with his use of  the land.89 Mugabe’s supporters responded to the ruling by kidnapping 
and roughing up Campbell and his son-in-law and burning their farm. Refusing to bow 
to pressure, Campbell and his lawyers continued to pursue the case after his release.90
The Tribunal issued its merits judgment in November 2008. The decision was bold 
in multiple respects. First, with regard to jurisdiction, Zimbabwe argued that the refer-
ences to ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of  law’ and non-discrimination in 
the SADC Treaty’s Principles and General Undertakings clauses91 could not be adjudi-
cated until the adoption of  a separate protocol.92 Since the member states had adopted 
other protocols clarifying the issues to be referred to the Tribunal or handled in other 
ways,93 the judges could reasonably have declined jurisdiction. Instead, they summar-
ily rejected Zimbabwe’s argument.94
Turning to the merits, the Tribunal ruled that Zimbabwe had violated the white 
landowners’ rights in three respects – denying access to justice, discriminating on the 
basis of  race and failing to provide fair compensation. The first of  these holdings was 
the least controversial. Had the Tribunal confined its decision to the access to justice 
issue, its ruling would have been a mostly symbolic victory for the plaintiffs. The two 
other violations, however, struck at the heart of  Mugabe’s land redistribution pro-
gramme. In defending its land reform programme against the non-discrimination 
claim, the government cited the need to remedy inequities that persisted after inde-
pendence. That most owners of  large agricultural lands happened to be white could 
not, therefore, ‘be attributed to racism but [rather to] circumstances brought about by 
colonial history’.95
88 SADC Tribunal, Gideon Stephanus Theron and 7 Others v.  Zimbabwe, Case No. SADC (T) 03/08, 04/08 
and 06/08, 28 March 2008 (application to intervene in Campbell case; granting intervention to 77 
white farmers and ordering injunctive relief), available at www.worldcourts.com/sadct/eng/deci-
sions/2008.03.28_Theron_v_Zimbabwe.htm (last visited 16 March 2016).
89 SADC Tribunal, Campbell v. Zimbabwe (Interim Ruling), Case No. SADC (T) 2/2007, 17 December 2007, 
at 8, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/217670/campbell-v-zimbabwe-case-no-
2-2007-ruling.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016).
90 According to newspaper accounts, Campbell later died from injuries he sustained during the kidnapping. 
D. Herbstein, ‘Mike Campbell Obituary’, The Guardian (24 April 2011), available at www.theguardian.
com/world/2011/apr/24/mike-campbell-obituary (last visited 16 March 2016).
91 SADC Treaty, supra note 80, Arts 4(c), 6(2).
92 Campbell, supra note 84, at 23. During the drafting of  the SADC Protocol, supra note 83, an expert panel 
considered, but ultimately rejected, the ‘inclusion of  human rights in the mandate of  the SADC Tribunal’. 
However, the panel also noted that the SADC already had ‘a more general human rights mandate’. 
F. Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (2012), at 492.
93 SADC Overview: Protocols, available at www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sa-protocols/ (last visited 16 
March 2016). For example, the SADC Trade Protocol envisions a World Trade Organization-style dispute 
settlement procedure administered by the Tribunal’s Registrar but involving ad hoc panels rather than 
adjudication by the Tribunal. South African Development Community Consolidated Protocol on Trade 
(2012), available at https://tis.sadc.int/files/6213/2808/8365/CONSOLIDATED_PROTOCOL_ON_
TRADE_vers_30-01-2012.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016), Annex VI.
94 Campbell, supra note 84, at 23–24.
95 Ibid., at 44.
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The judges disagreed, finding that the land reform programme had a disparate 
impact on white farmers that was ‘unjustifiable and disproportionate’ as well as ‘arbi-
trary and ... based primarily on considerations of  race’.96 Redistribution might be 
legitimate, the judges reasoned, if  lands were ‘distributed to poor, landless, and other 
disadvantaged and marginalized groups’. But the Tribunal found that ‘the spoils of  
expropriation’ had been distributed primarily to members of  the ruling party.97 The 
Tribunal next ruled that international law required the government ‘to protect the 
possession, occupation and ownership of ’ white farmers still on their land and to com-
pensate those whose lands it had already seized. Moreover, Zimbabwe could not rely 
on its Constitution to avoid these obligations.98
The political fallout of  the Campbell judgment was immediate. Mugabe showed noth-
ing but contempt for the decision and the Tribunal. His statement to supporters a few 
months after the judgment is illustrative: ‘Some farmers went to the SADC [T]ribunal 
in Namibia, but that’s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no one will follow that ... We have 
courts here in this country, that can determine the rights of  people. Our land issues 
are not subject to the SADC [T]ribunal.’99 Faced with government intransigence, the 
white farmers returned to court. Although Zimbabwe did not participate in the pro-
ceedings, the SADC judges found sufficient evidence to hold the state ‘in breach, and 
contempt’ of  the Campbell judgment and reported this finding to the SADC Summit 
– the community’s highest political body – for further action.100 The June 2009 con-
tempt ruling galvanized Mugabe into action.
Events unfolded with lightning speed over the next few weeks. In August 2009, the 
Tribunal’s president presented the Summit with a finding of  Zimbabwe’s non-com-
pliance, as required by Article 32 of  the Tribunal’s Protocol. This provision requires 
member states and community institutions to take ‘all measures necessary to ensure 
execution of  decisions’,101 yet there was great uncertainty regarding what such mea-
sures might be.102 The Summit referred the legal question to a Meeting of  the Minsters 
of  Justice and Attorneys General.
Meanwhile, Mugabe tasked Patrick Chinamasa, his Minister of  Justice and Legal 
Affairs, to develop a political strategy to challenge the Campbell litigation and discredit 
96 Ibid., at 53. The racial discrimination finding was disputed by Judge Tshosa, who concluded that whites 
were inevitably affected more significantly by the government’s land redistribution policy because they 
controlled most of  the country’s agricultural land. For further discussion, see Achiume, ‘Lawmaking, 
Geopolitical Dissonance, and the Authority of  International Courts: Lessons from the SADC Tribunal’, 
in K. Alter, L. Helfer and M. Madsen (eds), International Court Authority (forthcoming).
97 Campbell, supra note 84, at 54.
98 Ibid., at 58.
99 C. Chinaka, ‘Mugabe Says Zimbabwe Land Seizures Will Continue’, Mail and Guardian (28 February 
2009), available at http://mg.co.za/article/2009-02-28-mugabe-says-zimbabwe-land-seizures-will-con-
tinue (last visited 16 March 2016).
100 SADC Tribunal, Campbell and Another v. Republic of  Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 03/2009, 5 June 2009, available 
at www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2009/1.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
101 SADC Protocol, supra note 83, Art. 32.
102 Interview with former SADC Tribunal official (date and location withheld). SADC Treaty, supra note 80, 
Art. 33 authorizes the Summit to impose sanctions for persistent non-compliance. This provision has 
never been invoked, however.
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the SADC Tribunal. Chinamasa arrived at the Meeting of  Minsters of  Justice and 
Attorneys General with a 42-page memorandum arguing that the Tribunal had never 
been properly constituted. The common view, later upheld by an outside legal expert, 
was that the 2000 Protocol creating the Tribunal entered into force when it was 
adopted by three quarters of  the Heads of  State of  the SADC, including Zimbabwe, as 
provided for in the 1991 Treaty.103 Chinamasa argued that the Protocol was not bind-
ing because two thirds of  the member states, including Zimbabwe, had never ratified 
the Protocol. As a result, he argued, all SADC Tribunal rulings were null and void, 
and the member states were under no obligation to comply with them.104 This unex-
pected claim threw the meeting into disarray, delaying any discussion of  whether or 
how to sanction Zimbabwe’s non-compliance.105 A  week later, Chinamasa took the 
next logical step, informing the Registrar that Zimbabwe ‘would not appear before 
[the Tribunal] anymore, and neither would Government be bound by any decisions 
already made or future ones emanating from there’.106
Campbell’s lawyers and the Tribunal’s supporters rushed to defend the judges and 
their rulings.107 With the competing legal arguments now out in the open, the other 
member states had to decide how to respond to Zimbabwe’s attack. While ‘Chinamasa 
travelled to the regional capitals’ to lobby other governments,108 the SADC Council 
of  Ministers ‘was tasked with responding to Zimbabwe’s objections’ at the next SADC 
Summit scheduled for August 2010.109 A  month before that meeting, the Tribunal 
upped the political stakes by issuing another contempt ruling against Zimbabwe and 
again referring the country’s treaty violations to the Summit.110
We interviewed a former SADC judge about the contempt orders, asking whether the 
Tribunal members in fact expected the Summit to enforce the Campbell judgment. At the 
103 Ibid., Art. 36(1).
104 Execution and Enforcement of  Judgments of  the SADC Tribunal, Opinion of  the Government of  the 
Republic of  Zimbabwe on Issues Relating to International Law Raised at the Meeting of  Ministers of  
Justice/Attorneys-General, Pretoria, South Africa, July 30–31 2009, 31 August 2009.
105 Interview with Former SADC Tribunal Official (date and location withheld).
106 M. Sasa, ‘Zim Pulls out of  SADC Tribunal’, Herald (Zimbabwe, 2 September 2009) (quoting letter of  7 
August 2009), available at www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2009.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
107 E.g., Southern African Litigation Centre, Re: Submissions made by the Minister of  Justice, Zimbabwe, as 
to the Legal Competence of  the SADC Tribunal, The Enforceability of  its Decisions, and the Legal obliga-
tions of  the Zimbabwean Government, 22 September 2010, available at https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/
groups/zimsite/conversations/topics/40556 (last visited 16 March 2016).
108 Nathan, ‘Solidarity Triumphs over Democracy: The Dissolution of  the SADC Tribunal’, 57 Development 
Dialogue (2011) 123, at 130, available at http://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/19451?show=full 
(last visited 16 March 2016); see also Fritz, Up in Smoke, SAFPI Policy Brief  No. 11 (September 2012), at 
2, available at http://osf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Up-in-smoke-The-SADC-Tribunal-and-
Rule-of-Law-in-the-region.pdf  (last visited 16 March 2016).
109 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Implications of  the Decision to Review the Role, Functions 
and Terms of  Reference of  the SADC Tribunal: An Opinion (SALC Opinion) (undated, but likely early 
2011), para. 2, available at www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/research-papers/SADC%20
Opinion%20-%20final.pdf  (last visited16 March 2016). We have not been able to find this study, and it 
appears not to have been completed in time for the Summit.
110 SADC Tribunal, Fick and Another v. Republic of  Zimbabwe, SADC (T) 01/2010, 16 July 2010, available at 
www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2010/8.html (last visited 16 March 2016).
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time, Mugabe was brazenly ignoring a power-sharing deal that the SADC had brokered. If  
the sub-region’s political leaders had not sanctioned the president for violating an accord 
that they had publicly endorsed, it seems unimaginable that they would enforce a ruling 
that overturned his signature land redistribution policy. For the judges, however, the law 
provided a simple answer: ‘[T]he applicant was given a remedy; it needed to be enforced.’111
At the August 2010 Summit, Mugabe ‘threatened to block any discussion of  
Zimbabwe and its human rights record’.112 Although there is no public record of  the 
Summit proceedings, it seems that several member states opposed Zimbabwe’s actions. 
Officially, a compromise was reached whereby the Summit decided to hire an outside 
consultant to undertake ‘a review of  the role, functions and terms of  reference of  the 
SADC Tribunal’, to be concluded within six months.113
On its face, this was a plausible way to address the Tribunal’s unsettled legal status. 
Yet the compromise must be understood in light of  the decisions that the Summit did 
not take – the renewal of  five SADC judges whose terms were about to expire, and 
the replacement of  the Zimbabwean judge whom Mugabe had withdrawn in 2009. 
The SADC Secretariat had placed these issues on the Summit’s agenda. By taking no 
action, the heads of  state left the Tribunal with only four judges – below the minimum 
required to accept new complaints.114
The failure to reappoint the judges was a deliberate back-up strategy to Zimbabwe’s 
frontal assault on the Tribunal and the Campbell rulings. Mugabe first blocked discus-
sion of, and later derailed, a Minsters of  Justice and Attorneys General recommen-
dation to reappoint the judges whose terms had expired. This strategy exploited an 
ambiguity in the SADC Tribunal Protocol – its silence regarding the failure to renew or 
reappoint sitting judges.115 By refusing to agree to renew or reappoint the judges – acts 
that required the consent of  all member states – Mugabe ensured that the Tribunal 
would eventually cease to function even if  its legal mandate remained intact.
Initially, however, the outcome of  the 2010 Summit was only a partial victory for 
Zimbabwe, since the remaining SADC judges were still in office and were pressing for 
compliance with the Campbell judgment. To counter this threat, Mugabe and Justice 
Minister Chinamasa spun the Summit’s decision in the press as a formal suspension 
of  the Tribunal.116 SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomão attempted to thwart this 
111 Interview with Former Judge of  the SADC Tribunal, Gaborone, Botswana (9 August 2013).
112 Cowell, ‘The Death of  the Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s Human Rights 
Jurisdiction’, 131 Human Rights Law Review (2013) 153, at 161.
113 Final Communiqué of  the 30th Summit of  SADC Heads of  State and Government (19 August 2010), 
para. 32.
114 SALC Opinion, supra note 109, paras 4–5, 22–23.
115 SADC Protocol, supra note 83, Art. 4(6) provides that judicial vacancies shall be filled ‘within three (3) 
months of  the vacancy occurring’, but it is silent on what happens if  a judge’s term expires and the 
vacancy is unfilled. The EAC Treaty leaves this issue to ‘be determined by the Summit on the recom-
mendation of  the Council’, EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Arts 25(3), 25(5). By contrast, as noted above, the 
ECOWAS Court Protocol provides that a judge shall remain in office until a successor is appointed.
116 C. Zvayi, ‘Southern African Development Community Tribunal Suspended’, The Herald (17 August 
2010), available at http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2010/08/south-african-development-com-
munity.html (last visited 18 March 2016); ‘Mugabe Insists SADC Tribunal “Has Been Suspended”’, 23 
August 2010, cited in Nathan, supra note 79, at 878, n. 45.
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disinformation campaign by reiterating the Summit’s official position: ‘No one took 
a decision to suspend the Tribunal. What was said is that the Tribunal’s role [and] 
responsibility has to be reviewed by professionals and experts to come up with clear 
recommendations.’117
With charges and counter-charges flying, the next act in the backlash drama 
began to unfold – the Summit-mandated review of  the Tribunal’s powers and terms 
of  reference. The Secretariat issued a tender, awarding a contract to the World Trade 
Institute.118 The report, written by Cambridge University professor Lorand Bartels, 
categorically rejected Zimbabwe’s legal arguments, concluding that the Tribunal was 
validly constituted and authorized to review human rights complaints from private lit-
igants. The report also recommended that the Protocol be amended to presumptively 
reappoint Tribunal judges and officials unless the Summit chose to replace them.119 
The Minsters of  Justice and Attorneys General later endorsed this proposal as well as 
a recommendation to reappoint the existing SADC judges.120
Contemporaneous accounts suggest that the member states were divided over how 
to proceed. The Secretariat organized an Extraordinary Summit, which was held in 
May 2011, at which the Tribunal was the sole agenda item. Knowledge of  the meeting 
was withheld from Tribunal officials, who were notified only 48 hours in advance.121 
At the meeting, Zimbabwe reiterated its opposition to the status quo. It also derailed 
the Minister of  Justices and Attorneys General recommendation to reappoint the 
judges. The Summit’s final communiqué directed the ministers to prepare a fresh 
report proposing ‘amend[ments to] the relevant SADC legal instruments’ by August 
2012. The communiqué also purported to ‘reiterate[] the moratorium on receiving 
any new cases or hearings of  any cases by the Tribunal’ and declined to reappoint 
or replace any SADC judges.122 The formal minutes of  the meeting have never been 
released, and it is uncertain whether the Summit in fact made an affirmative decision 
to suspend the Tribunal and, if  it did, whether such a decision would be legal.123
117 ‘SADC Tribunal Not Suspended: Salamao’, The Zimbabwean (19 August 2010), available at http://www.
thezimbabwean.co/2010/08/sadc-tribunal-not-suspended-salamao/ (last visited 18 March 2016).
118 Email correspondence with Lorand Bartels (14 April 2015).
119 L. Bartels, Review of  the Role, Responsibility and Terms of  Reference of  the SADC Tribunal: Final Report 
(2011), at 6, available at www.scribd.com/doc/115660010/WTIA-Review-of-the-Role-Responsibilities-
and-Terms-of-Reference-of-the-SADC-Tribunal-Final-Report (last visited 17 March 2016). The report 
also recommended a series of  amendments to clarify ambiguities and resolve conflicts across SADC legal 
instruments while maintaining the Tribunal’s broad jurisdiction and access rules (at 70, 82–87).
120 Interview with SADC Tribunal Official (date and location withheld).
121 Justice Ariranga Pillay, former President of  SADC Tribunal, SADC Tribunal Dissolved by Unanimous 
Decision of  SADC Leaders (Pillay Speech), 11 July 2011, available at www.africancourtcoalition.org/
images/docs/subregionalcourts/sadctribunal/SADC%20Tribunal%20Dissolved%2020110718.pdf  
(last visited 17 March 2016).
122 Communiqué of  the Extraordinary Summit of  SADC Heads of  State and Government, 20 May 2011, 
paras 7–8.
123 Interview with SADC Tribunal Official (date and location withheld). See, e.g., D. Steinmann, ‘Summit 
Assigns Itself  Jurisdictional Powers It Does Not Have’, Namibia Economist (17 August 2012), available at 
https://economist.com.na/2548/editors-desk/summit-assigns-itself-jurisdictional-powers-it-does-not-
have/ (last visited 17 March 2016).
 at EJIL m
em
ber access on July 27, 2016
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa 313
During the next 15  months, human rights attorneys, NGOs and the judges 
themselves – all of  whom had been shut out of  the SADC decision-making pro-
cesses124 – attempted to mobilize to save the Tribunal. They faced an uphill battle. 
The Secretariat had become increasingly wary of  transparency and of  civil soci-
ety groups. It declined to release the Bartels report, leading the Tribunal’s backers 
to post it on the Internet.125 The intensely political environment, which included 
quietly voiced accounts of  Secretariat officials doctoring official communiqués to, 
in effect, supplant decisions taken by the Summit, created an atmosphere in which 
the SADC employees became reluctant to talk or share accounts of  what had in fact 
occurred.
To highlight the Tribunal’s emasculation, the SADC judges gave speeches, the NGOs 
held conferences, drafted resolutions and press statements and the attorneys prepared 
legal briefs outlining objections to the suspension.126 Partly in response to this ‘heavy 
lobbying’, the Ministers of  Justice and Attorneys General approved a revised draft 
Protocol that offered a compromise.127 The draft preserved the right of  private litigants 
to challenge legal violations and added an appeals chamber. But it also narrowed the 
Tribunal’s standing rules and made its human rights jurisdiction contingent on the 
adoption of  an additional legal instrument.128 On the crucial issue of  the Campbell 
case, however, the draft Protocol was unequivocal: ‘All actions, decisions, judgments 
and other administrative acts undertaken pursuant to the 2000 Protocol ... shall 
remain valid and in force.’129
124 E.g., Letter Submitted to Honorable Ministers of  Justice and Attorneys General re: Amendments to the 
Protocol Establishing the SADC Tribunal (1 June 2012), at 4, available at www.africancourtcoalition.
org/images/docs/subregionalcourts/sadctribunal/NGOs%20Letter%20to%20SADC%20Ministers%20
of%20Justice%20and%20Attorneys%20General.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016) (complaining that ‘it 
has been virtually impossible for us as SADC NGOs even to attend the SADC Summit or Ministers of  
Justice meetings on the sidelines’).
125 H. Melber, Promoting the Rule of  Law: Challenges for South Africa’s Policy, Open Society Foundation for 
South Africa SAFPI Commentary No. 5, 13 August 2012, at 9, available at http://osf.org.za/wp-content/
uploads/2015/08/Promoting-the-rule-of-law-Challenges-for-South-Africas-policy.pdf  (last visited 17 
March 2016).
126 See, e.g., Resolutions of  SADC Lawyers, Judges and Rule of  Law Advocates adopted at the 2nd Regional 
Legal Consultative Conference on the Review of  the SADC Tribunal, 28 July 2011, available at www.
africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/subregionalcourts/sadctribunal/2nd%20Consultative%20
conference%20on%20the%20review%20of%20SADC%20Tribunal%20-%20Resolutions.pdf  (last vis-
ited 17 March 2016); Pillay Speech, supra note 121; Submission Regarding Amendments to the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol: Relating to Access Provisions, the Relationship with Superior National Courts and 
Its Human Rights Mandate (undated, but likely 1 June 2012), available at www.africancourtcoalition.
org/images/docs/subregionalcourts/sadctribunal/NGOs%20Submission%20-%20Access%20and%20
jurisdiction%20issues%20at%20SADC%20Tribunal.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016).
127 F. Nijini, ‘Zimbabwe Wins Key Battle at Maputo Summit’, Southern Times (20 August 2012), available at 
http://southernafrican.news/2012/08/20/zimbabwe-wins-key-battle-at-maputo-summit/ (last visited 
17 March 2016).
128 Draft Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community 2000 As Amended, SADC/
MJ/2/2012/4, 19 June 2012, Art. 15, available at www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/draft_sadct_proto-
col.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016).
129 Ibid., Art. 58.
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Once again, Mugabe used the Summit to defeat the compromise. Zimbabwe could 
have settled for cabining the Tribunal’s human rights powers or appointing a new 
set of  politically timid judges. Instead, Mugabe lambasted the Ministers of  Justice 
proposal, renewing his claim that Western powers were stage-managing the SADC 
review process to target the country’s land redistribution policies.130 Multiple sources 
suggested that the Summit leaders decided to again return the issue of  the Tribunal’s 
future to the Ministers of  Justice and Attorneys General for reconsideration. The 
signed Summit decisions have never been circulated, however, and multiple sources 
told us that Zimbabwe worked with the Secretariat to doctor the official communiqué. 
The sole public record of  the meeting reflects an unequivocal victory for Zimbabwe – a 
call for a new Protocol that confines the Tribunal’s mandate to the ‘interpretation of  
the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States’.131
While the SADC insiders debated how they should respond to the hijacked Summit, 
Mugabe’s continued refusal to appoint Tribunal judges or staff  had, on its own, effect-
ively killed the sub-regional court. As a government official in Botswana explained, 
by mid-2013 the contracts of  the judges and staff  had run out, ‘[s]o now there is no 
SADC Tribunal’.132 This fait accompli gave Zimbabwe the upper hand in the negotia-
tions to reconstitute the Tribunal stripped of  private litigant access.
The Summit’s official communiqué devastated civil society groups.133 Advocates chal-
lenged the Tribunal’s suspension before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, but the Commission rejected the complaint.134 In August 2014, the SADC 
Summit adopted the new protocol, which removes the right of  private access, and it per-
mits member states to withdraw from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by giving 12 months 
notice.135 Nine African leaders, including Mugabe, signed the new instrument at the 
Summit, while civil society groups, Campbell’s lawyers and a former SADC judge decried 
the creation of  a ‘toothless and useless’ sub-regional court that is unlikely to hear any 
cases.136 Meanwhile, lawyers for Mike Campbell attempted to enforce the Tribunal’s rul-
ings in South African courts, eventually collecting modest damages from Zimbabwe.137
130 Nijini, supra note 127.
131 Final Communiqué of  32nd Summit of  SADC Heads of  State and Government, 18 August 2012, para. 
24.
132 Interview with Official of  the Botswana Trade Ministry, Gaborone, Botswana (8 August 2013).
133 R. Lee, SADC Leaders Destroy SADC Tribunal, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 20 August 2012, 
available at www.osisa.org/law/regional/sadc-leaders-destroy-sadc-tribunal (last visited 17 March 2016).
134 A. Bell, ‘Top African Court “Powerless” to Reinstate SADC Tribunal’, SW Radio Africa (6 March 2014), 
available at www.tralac.org/news/article/5511-top-african-court-powerless-to-reinstate-sadc-tribunal.
html (last visited 17 March 2016).
135 Draft Protocol of  the SADC Tribunal, 18 August 2014, Art. 50 (copy on file with authors); see also 
G. Erasmus, The New Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for SADC 
Community Law, TRALAC Working Paper No. US15WP/2015 (January 2015), available at www.tralac.
org/publications/article/6900-the-new-protocol-for-the-sadc-tribunal-jurisdictional-changes-and-
implications-for-sadc-community-law.html#downloads (last visited 17 March 2016).
136 Interview with Former Judge of  the SADC Tribunal, Gaborone, Botswana (9 August 2013).
137 The lawyers secured a favourable ruling from the South African Constitutional Court that forced Zimbabwe 
to make a $20,000 payment to avoid execution on property it owned in South Africa. D. Smith, ‘Zimbabwe 
Government’s U-Turn on White Farmers’, Mail and Guardian (20 September 2013), available at http://mg.co.
za/article/2013-09-20-00-zimbabwe-governments-u-turn-on-white-farmers/ (last visited 17 March 2016).
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3 Comparing the Three Backlashes: Similarities and 
Differences
The three backlash attempts we analyse highlight the difficulty of  collectively sanc-
tioning international courts for politically embarrassing rulings, even for govern-
ments that are weakly committed to judicial independence. The barriers to carrying 
out backlash proposals are political and institutional. Politically, even governments 
that share concerns about controversial adverse international court rulings may 
be reluctant to openly support national leaders who commit human rights abuses 
against their own citizens. Institutionally, inertia is on the side of  international courts 
– blocking change is easier than reaching consensus in favour of  altering the status 
quo. Before offering our own explanation of  the divergent outcomes of  the three court 
backlash campaigns, we first identify institutional and power-based similarities and 
differences that allow us to eliminate or at least diminish alternative explanations. 
Table 1 compares these features across the three cases.
For all three sub-regional communities, membership brought with it the compul-
sory jurisdiction of  a sub-regional court. Unilateral withdrawal from the Court’s juris-
diction was not a legally viable option without exiting the community as a whole. All 
three courts also provided direct access to private litigants alleging state violations of  
community treaties, which expressly or implicitly incorporated references to human 
rights. In addition, all three international courts were young institutions that began 
to function in the 2000s, and all three backlashes responded to adverse rulings issued 
in the first few years of  each court’s operation.
Perhaps most importantly, each sub-regional community requires consensus to 
modify the Court’s jurisdiction and access rules. The give and take required to reach 
consensus affects whether court curbing campaigns succeed and to what extent. In 
East Africa, for example, the opposition of  Tanzania and Uganda to Kenya’s initial 
push to eliminate the EACJ was crucial to moderating the backlash. The need to obtain 
consensus may also explain why the Gambia touted its campaign against the ECOWAS 
Court as a relatively modest judicial reform proposal. It is also possible, however, for 
one state to repeatedly block consensus, transforming the decision-making rule into a 
de facto unanimity requirement. Zimbabwe’s dogged refusals to acquiesce in reforms 
that fell short of  removing private party access to the SADC Tribunal illustrates an 
effective use of  this strategy.
Table 1 reinforces a key finding that emerges from the three narratives – the gov-
ernment leading each backlash campaign had to expend considerable political capital 
and effort to achieve its objectives, and it did not succeed immediately or in full. For 
example, the aggrieved governments failed to pressure sub-regional judges to revise or 
withdraw their decisions, and they could not convince other member states to elimi-
nate the tribunal or overturn its contested legal rulings.
The swiftness of  the EAC backlash stands out, however. Kenya’s partial success in 
restructuring the Court was aided by the small number of  geographically close mem-
ber states whose leaders meet regularly and discuss sub-regional integration issues 
outside of  official decision-making venues. Zimbabwe’s effort to strip private litigant 
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access to the SADC Tribunal illustrates the other end of  the time spectrum. The con-
sensus rule required to revise the Tribunal’s mandate repeatedly generated compro-
mise proposals that Zimbabwe thwarted. Mugabe’s ‘plan B’ – starving the Tribunal by 
blocking judicial renewals and appointments – was a multi-year strategy. However, 
once the sub-regional court was no longer operational, Zimbabwe could dictate the 
terms of  its resurrection and insist on stripping private party access.
Another difference among the three cases is the economic and political power of  the 
country orchestrating the backlash. Kenya and Nigeria are the undisputed economic 
and political hegemons in East and West Africa, respectively. Zimbabwe’s economy is 
in disarray, but its political influence in the SADC is elevated by Mugabe’s prominence 
as one of  Africa’s longest-serving leaders and his anti-colonial bona fides. The clear 
outlier among the three countries is the Gambia, which is small in size, population 
and economic clout.
Might the failure of  the ECOWAS Court backlash thus be explained by the Gambia’s 
relatively weak status in West Africa? No doubt, opposing President Jammeh was 
less costly than challenging leaders of  more powerful ECOWAS nations.138 The lack 
of  popular support for the Gambian government in the region also facilitated opposi-
tion to its proposals. These factors are not decisive, however. Prior to issuing the two 
judgments that enraged the Gambia, ECOWAS judges had found other West African 
governments in violation of  their citizens’ human rights. Moreover, many of  the then 
pending cases were against Nigeria, which had previously objected to the Court’s 
attempt to intervene in a contested election in that country.139 Moreover, the Gambia’s 
reforms were the most modest of  the three backlash proposals, and some of  them were 
recently revived in the guise of  genuine improvements to the Court.140 For all of  these 
reasons, it would have been relatively uncontroversial for other West African govern-
ments to accede to the Gambia’s proposals.
Another plausible, but ultimately unhelpful, explanation for the divergent back-
lash outcomes concerns the process for appointing sub-regional judges. The law and 
politics of  appointments may explain the extent to which international court judges 
are bold or timid, but they cannot explain whether court-curbing campaigns succeed 
or fail. Stacking an international court with pro-government judges following a dis-
favoured ruling might, however, be a way to clip a court’s wings. Yet none of  the three 
governments pursued this strategy. A  partial exception is the EACJ, whose member 
states have appointed somewhat more conservative judges to the Appellate Division. 
In the decade since the backlash, however, the appellate judges have not appreciably 
constrained the EACJ’s foray into human rights.
138 See Viljoen, supra note 92, at 499 (referring to the Gambia’s status as ‘one of  the smallest and least power-
ful states in ECOWAS’ as helping to defeat its proposal).
139 For further discussion, see Alter, Helfer, and McAllister, supra note 1, at 758–760.
140 ECOWAS Retreat Adopts Recommendation for Setting Up an ECOWAS Court Appellate Body and 
Sub-Registries, Press Release, March 2013 available at www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=214:ecowas-retreat-adopts-recommendation-for-setting-
up-an-ecowas-court-appellate-body-and-sub-registries (last visited 17 March 2016).
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A final difference pertains to the subject matter of  the contested rulings. The decisions 
against the Gambia – disappearance and torture of  dissident journalists – were unequiv-
ocal human rights abuses that no government openly defended. The EALA elections 
case, in contrast, involved a dispute over the boundary between community and domes-
tic law, a first-impression issue of  jurisdiction that was amenable to good faith disagree-
ment. The challenge to Zimbabwe’s land rights regime was by far the most incendiary of  
the three suits. All post-colonial societies struggle with the fraught legacy of  highly con-
centrated property ownership. Thus, there was much sympathy among regional leaders 
when Zimbabwe argued that ‘if  it happens to us, it happens to you next’.141
These subject matter differences cannot, however, explain why the Kenyan 
and Zimbabwean backlashes succeeded in part. Land rights may well be a third 
rail of  post-colonial politics in Africa. But without Mugabe’s intransigence, one 
of  the many compromise proposals could well have succeeded. In fact, the SADC 
Tribunal’s supporters repeatedly convinced the region’s Ministers of  Justice and 
Attorneys General to endorse reforms that retained private litigant access. Also, in 
interviews SADC insiders reported that until the new protocol’s adoption, Summit 
decisions had supported returning the issue to the ministers for further review and a 
possible compromise. However, Mugabe’s strategy of  blocking these proposals while 
starving the Tribunal of  judges and staff  eventually forced the other member states 
to accept stripping private access as the price to be paid for resurrecting the sub-
regional court.
4 Explaining the Divergence in Backlash Outcomes: The 
Role of  Community Secretariats, Civil Society Groups and 
Sub-Regional Parliaments
The difficulty of  successful backlash suggests a clear strategy for international court 
supporters: calling for adherence to established decision-making procedures. Delaying 
and publicizing sanctioning campaigns allows tempers to cool, exposes the ulterior 
motives of  seemingly benign proposals and shames other governments from tacitly 
supporting court-curbing efforts. In addition, by insisting that states follow these 
procedures, secretariats, civil society groups and regional parliaments can slow 
down sanctioning initiatives, enhance transparency and create opportunities to rally 
against backlash proposals.
This section examines the varying ability of  these actors to mobilize to defeat the 
three backlash campaigns. We focus on the political and institutional culture within 
the community secretariats and their relationships to civil society groups as well as 
the groups’ organizational capacity and resources. In East Africa, the EALA also pro-
vided an additional source of  support for the court, something that was lacking in the 
other two sub-regions.
141 Interview with a Former Official of  the SADC Lawyers Association, Gaborone, Botswana (9 August 
2013).
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A Sub-Regional Secretariats as Brokers in Managing International 
Court Backlash
The secretariats in each sub-region are comprised of  a chief  executive – a political 
appointee – supported by a professional staff  responsible for legal and policy mat-
ters within the community’s purview. Secretariats organize meetings of  government 
officials, set agendas, coordinate logistics and prepare official documents. They also 
advise states and political appointees on draft legislation and assist with the reviews 
of  community institutions. On paper, these decisions are matters of  public record. In 
reality, community websites are often out of  date, and hard copies are unavailable. 
Knowledge of  these decisions – and opportunities for input by civil society – thus 
depend on how forthcoming Secretariat officials are in disseminating information to 
interested stakeholders.
The political culture and professionalization within the secretariats determines 
whether these bodies exert independent influence within an overarching structure of  
state power. These factors affect the willingness and ability of  Secretariat officials and 
staff  to meaningfully defend community interests, including by engaging civil society 
groups. The expectations of  member states and political appointees shape this culture. 
Where governments expect secretariats to be concierges or helpmeets, officials and 
staff  become less open and transparent, excluding civil society groups and acquiesc-
ing to extra-legal pressures to ignore community decision-making procedures.
In West Africa during the years of  the backlash, the staff  of  the ECOWAS Secretariat 
had earned the member states’ trust and thus had considerable autonomy to carry out 
its activities. For example, the Legal Affairs Department spearheaded the initiative to 
give the ECOWAS Court a human rights jurisdiction. When governments expressed 
concern about some early court decisions, the Secretariat facilitated the creation of  an 
ECOWAS Judicial Council that used a merit-based process for selecting judges.
With regard to the Gambian backlash, Secretariat officials followed procedures that 
required informing ECOWAS judges about court reform proposals, a disclosure that 
enabled the judges to reach out to allies to oppose the initiatives.142 Officials also gave 
advance notice about key meetings, enabling civil society groups to attend and pres-
ent their views. The presence of  NGOs at these meetings signalled to governments that 
their actions were being scrutinized by networked groups who could quickly dissemi-
nate the decisions. The ECOWAS Secretariat thus influenced the fate of  the backlash 
proposals through information sharing and indirect coalition building.
The situation in the EAC was quite different. The Secretariat seemingly did not 
object when Kenya scheduled a series of  rushed extraordinary meetings at which 
national political leaders discussed the EACJ’s fate. In fairness, the Secretariat faced 
immense pressure from Kenya, whose top officials – incensed at the EACJ’s injunction 
in the Nyong’o case – were highly motivated, called meetings outside normal chan-
nels and drafted treaty amendments to clip the Court’s wings. Moreover, Uganda and 
Tanzania – although unwilling to kill the EACJ – supported or at least acquiesced in 
142 ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate, Legal Adviser, Abuja, Nigeria (7 March 2011).
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Kenya’s more moderate reform proposals, limiting any manoeuvring room Secretariat 
officials may have had to slow down the backlash campaign.
Yet the EAC Secretariat refrained from following mandatory procedures that could 
have bolstered support for the sub-regional court. In particular, we found no evidence 
that officials informed or sought the input of  civil society actors regarding Kenya’s 
backlash proposal, notwithstanding express community rules requiring such consul-
tation.143 On the contrary, we were told that the Secretariat – and, in particular, its 
Office of  Legal Counsel – generally avoided, or put off  interactions with, civil society 
groups agitating to strengthen the community legal order.144
It is not surprising that the EAC officials viewed their mandate primarily through 
the prism of  member state interests. Until recently, government lobbying rather than a 
competitive, merits-based process was used to recruit professional staff.145 Further, the 
Secretariat reports to the Council of  Ministers, the community’s top political body that 
represents member state interests. The control exercised by the Council has deterred 
the Secretariat from expanding its autonomy or even from exercising the authority 
expressly conferred by the EAC Treaty.146 In sum, EAC Secretariat officials did not 
attempt to leverage NGOs that promote human rights and the rule of  law in East 
Africa as a counterweight to Kenya’s backlash proposal. Perhaps ironically, the Court 
itself  has done a much better job of  mobilizing support from civil society.147
In the SADC, the toxic political climate makes it difficult to assess the extent of  the 
Secretariat’s efforts to protect the Tribunal from Mugabe’s wrath. Executive Secretary 
Salomão countered early attempts by Zimbabwe to spin a modest Summit decision as 
a vindication of  the country’s more radical position, and Secretariat officials seem-
ingly worked in good faith with the Ministers of  Justices and Attorneys General to 
craft compromise solutions, including a new draft protocol for the Tribunal. However, 
as Mugabe escalated the confrontation and blocked compromise proposals that would 
have partly preserved private access to the Tribunal, the Secretariat became less forth-
coming in sharing information with Tribunal supporters and more closely aligned 
with the backlash campaign.
143 See D. Deya, The Place of  Civil Society in the Eastern African Community, Outline for a Session in the 
Kitua Cha Katiba Intensive Seminar on the East African Community: Organs, Institutions and Procedures 
(on file with authors).
144 Interview with Human Rights Advocate M, Nairobi, Kenya (1 August 2013).
145 See A.  Odhiambo, ‘Five Kenyans Short-Listed for Top EAC Jobs’, Business Daily Africa (18 January 
2015), available at www.businessdailyafrica.com/Five-Kenyans-shortlisted-for-top-EAC-jobs/-
/539546/2593728/-/14rpt43/-/index.html (last visited 17 March 2016).
146 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 71(1) provides: ‘In the performance of  their functions, the staff  of  the 
Community shall not seek or receive instructions from any Partner State. ... They shall refrain from any 
actions which may adversely reflect on their position as international civil servants and shall be respon-
sible only to the Community.’
147 According to the first EACJ Registrar, the judges ‘boldly went around the region meeting its stakeholders 
including bar associations, business communities, civil societies, law reform commissions and Attorney 
Generals’. J. Ruhusinga, Litigation in the East African Court of  Justice, Paper Presented to the East African 
Law Society, African Executive, 12–19 July 2006, available at www.africanexecutive.com/modules/mag-
azine/articles.php?article=794 (last visited 17 March 2016).
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The SADC Secretariat also circumvented or ignored applicable procedures. Officials 
denied funds to cover the travel and lodging expenses of  SADC judges, limiting their 
ability to convene at the Tribunal. Officials also failed to announce upcoming meetings 
and decisions. For example, the Tribunal’s president complained bitterly about his de 
facto exclusion from key meetings.148 Perhaps most significantly, numerous sources 
told us that key Secretariat staff  colluded with Zimbabwe in preparing public state-
ments that misrepresented official Summit decisions.
Towards the end of  the backlash campaign, civil society groups demanded access 
to the SADC meetings and to records of  official decisions. But their complaints fell on 
deaf  ears. This may well have reflected political reality – the unbending will of  Mugabe, 
the de facto withering of  the Tribunal due to blocked judicial appointments and the 
continued acquiescence of  other member states. By August 2013 when Mugabe was 
elected to the SADC’s rotating chairmanship,149 any astute Secretariat official could 
see the writing on the wall.
B Civil Society Mobilization to Oppose International Court Backlash
Civil society participation is a common and distinctive feature of  European-style eco-
nomic communities. The West, East and Southern Africa integration projects are no 
exception. They include procedures for soliciting the views of  civil society actors in 
collective decision-making processes. All three sub-regions require that civil society 
groups register with community institutions, a status that enables them to consult 
with officials and to attend key meetings. To be eligible for registration, civil society 
groups must demonstrate that their membership extends across each sub-region. 
Partly to meet this requirement, many bar associations, law societies and human 
rights NGOs in Africa have organized themselves transnationally.
In all three cases in our study, sub-regional civil society groups were aware of  the 
government’s backlash efforts and actively mobilized to oppose them. What, then, 
explains the groups’ varied influence in thwarting the backlash campaigns? Part of  
the answer is how organized, cohesive and well-resourced the groups were in each 
sub-region and how close a relationship they developed with community secretariats.
In West Africa, human rights organizations and law societies have been working 
with the ECOWAS Secretariat for many years. Elsewhere, we explain how human 
rights appeared on the agenda of  ECOWAS in the early 1990s in response to cred-
ible evidence of  atrocities committed by military forces participating in an ECOWAS-
sanctioned humanitarian intervention in Liberia.150 When member states later 
revamped the sub-region’s collective security institutions, they also included broad 
participation rules for civil society actors.151
148 Pillay Speech, supra note 121, at 4–5.
149 ‘Mugabe to Become Next SADC Leader’, News 24 (20 August 2013), available at www.news24.com/
Africa/Zimbabwe/Mugabe-to-become-next-SADC-leader-20130820 (last visited 17 March 2016).
150 Alter, Helfer, and McAllister, supra note 1, at 744.
151 Decision A/DEC.9/8/94 Establishing Regulations for the Grant to Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
the Status of  Observer within the Institutions of  the Community, 6 August 1994, discussed in K. Oteng 
Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of  the Economic Community of  West African States (2006), at 49–50.
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Capitalizing on these rules, human rights groups organized transnationally begin-
ning in 2001, the same year that the ECOWAS Court was created. The West African 
Bar Association followed in 2004, resolving to ‘supplement the work of  [ECOWAS] by 
promoting [the] rule of  law, fundamental human rights and democracy in the sub-
region’.152 Human rights groups and the regional bar association partnered with the 
Secretariat to strengthen the community legal order. The Legal Affairs Directorate 
actively consulted the groups regarding the 2005 Protocol giving the ECOWAS Court 
a human rights jurisdiction. And, as described in detail above, the Directorate fol-
lowed the civil society participation rules, ensuring that advocates were aware of, 
and could attend, key meetings at which the Gambia’s court-curbing proposals were 
debated.
In East Africa, the EALS and the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU) are highly 
organized and maintain a permanent presence in Arusha, the home of  the EAC, 
the EACJ and other international courts. Founded in 1995 and based in Arusha, 
the EALS has built personal connections with Secretariat officials and sub-regional 
judges. The PALU is a more recent creation, founded in 2010 to better coordinate 
Africa’s Anglophone and Francophone bar associations. These organizations oper-
ate with a lean, but highly capable, staff. The EALS is also well financed by manda-
tory dues from attorneys who renew their practice certificates with their national bar 
association.
Formally, the EALS has observer status with the EAC and the right to participate 
in Council meetings.153 Yet the society’s influence has been stymied by a lack of  close 
alignment between its objectives and those of  the EAC Office of  Legal Counsel.154 
Attorneys told us that Legal Counsel staff  had cancelled meetings at the last minute 
and lost or delayed their requests for documents. Other EAC practices also minimize 
participation, either by design or happenstance: ‘Council meetings are often planned 
at the last minute, and there is often little prior notice given to EALS so that it can 
secure attendance of  one of  its officers.’155
As explained above, EAC officials are focused on carrying out the objectives of  mem-
ber states. Consultations with civil society groups do occur but mainly when their 
interests overlap with those of  the Secretariat. For example, the East African Business 
Council was regularly consulted regarding drafts of  sub-regional economic legisla-
tion.156 And NGOs working on development, gender, youth, children and business 
issues are also involved in EAC Secretariat activities.157
With regard to human rights groups, however, the EAC’s Office of  Legal Counsel 
is more wary. One lawyer told us that the Legal Council staff  informally consulted 
152 General News Association, West African Bar Association Inaugurated, 24 August 2004, available at 
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?IBID=64712 (last visited 17 March 
2016).
153 Gathii, supra note 31, at 282.
154 EAC Treaty, supra note 30, Art. 69 establishes the EAC Office of  Legal Counsel as a body within the EAC 
Secretariat.
155 Gathii, supra note 31, at 282, n. 214.
156 Interview with a policy coordinator at East African Business Council, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
157 Deya, supra note 143.
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with the PALU after governments expressed doubt about a Secretariat report on a 
legal issue.158 The Secretariat also met with the EALS and the PALU to discuss a mem-
ber state proposal to give the EACJ jurisdiction over international crimes, while, at 
the same time, sidelining the EALS’ key objective of  adopting a protocol to confer an 
express human rights mandate on the court.159 Seen in this light, it is not surprising 
that the Secretariat officials did not consult the EALS and the PALU about Kenya’s 
plans to weaken the EACJ following the N’yongo ruling. The EALS later challenged 
the lack of  civil society participation in the treaty amendment process, and the judges 
validated their complaint:
We think that construing the Treaty as if  it permits sporadic amendments at the whims of  
officials without any form of  consultation with stakeholders would be a recipe for regression to 
the ... ‘lack of  strong participation of  the private sector and civil society’ that led to the collapse of  
the previous Community.160
Yet the court declined to annul the amendments on prudential grounds, declaring 
that ‘the requirement of  involvement of  people in the Treaty amendment process shall 
have prospective application’.161 This cautious holding may reflect the judges’ prag-
matic recognition that, although the Secretariat had circumvented rules requiring 
civil society participation, the amendments were a fait accompli that member states 
would not reverse.
In Southern Africa, the SADC Lawyers Association was mostly excluded from com-
munity-level consultations regarding the Tribunal. Even before Zimbabwe’s backlash 
campaign, the SADC Secretariat and the Association had a standoffish relationship. 
According to a former member of  the Association’s leadership, the Secretariat viewed 
the lawyers group as ‘too noisy’ and tended to avoid informal contact. In addition, the 
group’s observer status in the SADC has remained in a ‘gray area’. The group does 
not want to formalize its relationship to the community because, according to this 
official, registered NGOs are pressured to ‘toe the line’ of  the member states and the 
Secretariat.162
The lack of  a close relationship with the Secretariat is one reason why the SADC 
Lawyers Association has moved twice since it was established in 1999 – first, in 2003, 
from its initial home in Pretoria, South Africa, to Gaborone, Botswana, and again in 
2011 from Gaborone back to Pretoria.163 The first move was in hopes of  working more 
closely with the Secretariat. The second reflected the difficulty of  partnering with SADC 
officials and the reality that more businesses, law firms and NGOs are based in Pretoria.
Capacity constraints also undermine the influence of  the SADC Lawyers Association. 
Unlike the EALS, which is funded by mandatory dues from individual lawyers, the 
158 Interview with Human Rights Advocate L, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
159 Interview with Official from the Pan African Lawyer’s Association, Arusha, Tanzania (30 July 2013).
160 East Africa Law Society, supra note 55, at 30 (emphasis in original).
161 Ibid., at 44.
162 Interview with a Former Official of  the SADC Lawyers Association, Gaborone, Botswana (9 August 
2013).
163 Interview with Officials of  the Law Society of  Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8 August 2013).
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Association is dependent on dues collected by national bar associations. National 
associations often fail to pay or are late in forwarding dues. The lack of  stable funding 
forces the Association to rely on volunteers, making it more difficult to file complaints 
or amicus briefs with the Tribunal.164
Dispersed geography is also a factor. The SADC Lawyers Association and most 
regional NGOs are based in Pretoria, South Africa, while the SADC Secretariat is based 
in Gaborone, Botswana. The Tribunal’s seat is in Windhoek, Namibia, and procedural 
rules require that all cases be filed in person. Summit meetings rotate around major cities 
in the 15 member states. This dispersion makes it more difficult for lawyers and NGOs to 
develop informal and formal contacts and relationships with SADC judges and officials.
The lack of  a strong and cohesive SADC bar association has created space for the civil 
society stage to be occupied by foreign-funded NGOs such as the Open Society Initiative of  
Southern Africa (supported by the Soros Foundation) and the Southern Africa Litigation 
Centre (jointly funded by Soros and the International Bar Association). While these 
NGOs hire skilled human rights lawyers, they make easy targets for political leaders like 
Mugabe, who discredit them as thinly veiled fronts for Western nations seeking to inter-
fere with the internal politics of  African nations.165 The location of  these foreign-funded 
NGOs in the more constitutionally progressive South Africa adds to this perception.
For all of  these reasons, the SADC Secretariat mostly sidelined the civil society 
groups that rallied to save the Tribunal. As noted above, foreign-funded NGOs repeat-
edly protested their exclusion from meetings at which political leaders debated the 
Tribunal’s fate. The SADC Lawyers Association fared little better. Instead, it focused on 
public statements and lobbying government officials.166 These tactics helped to secure 
the support of  the Ministers of  Justice for compromise proposals, but they were insuf-
ficient to overcome Zimbabwe’s intransigent opposition.
C Sub-Regional Parliaments as Potential Venues for Opposition 
Politics
Parliamentary bodies associated with regional and sub-regional integration projects 
may provide another venue for resisting attempts by national executives to circumvent 
community procedures, including those protecting international courts against politi-
cal backlashes. Many will find this claim surprising. Conventional wisdom holds that 
regional legislatures are, with the possible exception of  the European Parliament, little 
164 Ibid.
165 E.g., Permanent Mission of  the Republic of  Zimbabwe to the United Nations, Statement of  Patrick 
A. Chinamasa (MP), UN Human Rights Council (June 2006), available at www.icnl.org/news/2006/07-
10_Zimbabwe.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016).
166 See SADC Lawyers Association, Whither the SADC Tribunal: Report of  Regional Colloquium on the SADC 
Tribunal, Johannesburg (March 2013), at 19–20, available at www.sadcla.org/new1/sites/default/files/
Report%20of%20the%20Regional%20Colloquium%20on%20the%20SADC%20Tribunal_1.pdf  (last 
visited 17 March 2016); SADC Lawyers Association, Statement on SADC Tribunal, Regional Governance 
Issues, 16 August 2013 (condemning the decision to strip private litigant access to the Tribunal), avail-
able at http://www.igd.org.za/index.php/research/international-diplomacy/sadc-institutions/5328-sadc-
lawyers-association-statement-on-sadc-tribunal-regional-governance-issues (last visited 18 March 2016).
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more than talk shops. This is largely true for the ECOWAS Parliament, which lacked any 
legislative powers or budgetary approval authority until a 2014 institutional overhaul.167 
The SADC Parliamentary Forum is even weaker. It is not formally recognized as a com-
munity institution and does not coordinate its activities with other SADC initiatives.168
The situation in East Africa is different. The members of  the EALA are elected from 
their respective national parliaments in proportion to the strength of  each member 
country’s political parties. The sub-regional legislature is also financially and politi-
cally independent from the member states. As the Nyong’o litigation aptly demon-
strates, these attributes make the EALA an attractive venue for opposition politicians. 
They also provide opportunities for parliamentarians to support international court 
judges against attacks by national executives.
The EALA was an early supporter of  the EACJ in at least three important ways. First, 
the Assembly passed resolutions urging the EAC Summit to appoint the inaugural 
group of  sub-regional judges and to upgrade the registrar of  the Court to an executive 
position.169 Second, three EALA members brought the very first case to the EACJ – a 
challenge to the authority of  the Council of  Ministers to supervise the Assembly’s leg-
islative agenda. Notably, the EALA as a body supported the suit over the objections of  
the EAC Legal Secretariat.170 The EACJ sided with the Assembly, a decision lauded by 
civil society groups – whom the court had allowed to file amicus curiae submissions – as 
a milestone for upholding the rule of  law in East Africa.171 Third, the EALA has lobbied 
to increase funding for the EACJ to ensure that the court can continue to hear suits 
raising human rights issues.172 By supporting the activation of  the EACJ, bringing its 
first case and publicly supporting the inclusion of  a human rights mandate, the EALA 
167 In 2014, the member states expanded the Parliament’s powers to include approval of  the community 
budget, certain oversight responsibilities for ECOWAS organs and the appointment of  community offi-
cials. ‘Finally ECOWAS Enhances Power of  ECOWAS Parliament’, African Examiner (15 December 2014), 
available at www.africanexaminer.com/finally-ecowas-enhances-the-powers-of-the-ecowas-parliament/ 
(last visited 17 March 2016).
168 SADC Treaty, supra note 80, Art. 9(1), which establishes SADC institutions, does not mention the 
Forum. But see SADC Tribunal, Bookie Monica Kethusegile v.  SADC Parliamentary Forum, Case No. 
SADC 02 (2009) (asserting that a SADC Summit decision elevated the Forum to a SADC institution); 
see also S. Kingah, EU’s Engagement with African Sub-Regional Parliaments of  ECOWAS, SADC, EAC 
and AU, UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2012/8 (2012), at 9, available at www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/
workingpapers/W-2012–8.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016).
169 See East African Legislative Assembly, Eight Years of  EALA: 2001–2009 (September 2009), at 9 (noting 
that the EALA passed a resolution urging the Council of  Ministers to appoint EACJ judges and a registrar 
to establish their terms of  service).
170 On the objections of  the EAC Legal Counsel, see EALA Legislative Assembly, Official Report of  the Proceedings 
of  EALA, 59th Sitting – First Assembly: First Meeting-Fifth Session, 6 December 2005, available at www.
eala.org/key-documents/doc_details/70-6-december-2005.html (last visited 17 March 2016).
171 EACJ, Mwatela v. EAC, Application No. 1 of  2005, Ruling, 1 October 2006 (Tanzania), at 15.
172 S. Bageine, Budget Speech of  the EAC for Financial Year 2013/2014 to the EALA, 30 May 2013; see also 
Roundtable on Strengthening the Implementation of  Human Rights in the EAC Region: The Role of  the 
East African Legislative Assembly, Arusha, Tanzania (27 May 2011) (urging the East Africa Legislative 
Assembly to advocate for increased resources to enable the EACJ to effectively carry out its human rights 
protection mandate), available at www.wfd.org/upload/docs/Communique%20-%20Launch%20of%20
Human%20Rights%20Handbook%20in%20EALA.pdf  (last visited 17 March 2016).
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provided an additional venue to defend the sub-regional judges against the wrath of  
national executives.
5 Conclusion
This article has described three credible attempts to sanction sub-regional interna-
tional courts in Africa for rulings that criticized the behaviour of  national govern-
ments. In ECOWAS, the Secretariat followed procedures that enabled civil society 
groups to oppose the Gambia’s court-curbing campaign, preventing officials from col-
luding behind closed doors to hobble the fledgling sub-regional court. Even though 
Gambian President Jammeh’s proposals were the most modest of  the three backlash 
attempts we analyse, they failed to secure the support of  other ECOWAS member 
states.
In East Africa, Kenyan government officials called rushed, unofficial meetings to 
circumvent EAC decision-making processes. The speed of  Kenya’s response, and the 
small number of  EAC member states, made it difficult for civil society groups to thwart 
these extra-legal efforts. Still, Kenya’s Attorney General failed to accomplish the gov-
ernment’s more radical goals: the EACJ was not disbanded; its Kenyan judges were not 
removed from office and the government ultimately complied with the offending EACJ 
ruling.
In the SADC, national political leaders eventually acquiesced to Zimbabwean 
President Mugabe’s demands, allowing his blocking of  judicial reappointments to 
de facto suspend the Tribunal and later agreeing to strip the right of  private access. 
But this successful backlash was hard fought. The SADC Secretariat and sympathetic 
government officials initially countered Mugabe’s legal arguments, pushed for com-
promises and repeatedly returned the issue to the Ministers of  Justice and Attorneys 
General for further study rather than agree to Mugabe’s demands. Indeed, Zimbabwe’s 
efforts to discredit the legal validity of  the Tribunal and its rulings in the Campbell 
cases failed. In the end, however, Mugabe’s persistence, tenacity and wily political tac-
tics won out.
We have argued that successful governments sanctioning efforts depend on two 
factors – the decision by community secretariats to follow or circumvent procedures 
that require consultations with non-state actors and the mobilization strategies of  
human rights groups and lawyers associations in support of  the courts. In ECOWAS, 
Secretariat officials adhered to procedural rules for notifying civil society groups and 
facilitating their participation in key meetings. Public and private lobbying by these 
groups helped to reframe the Gambia’s court-curbing initiative as a self-interested 
reaction to rulings that exposed the country’s abysmal human rights record. In the 
EAC, Kenya rapidly convened unofficial meetings to circumvent more deliberative con-
sultation procedures, creating a fait accompli of  court reforms that, while less severe 
than what the government initially wanted, have nonetheless affected the EACJ’s 
subsequent trajectory. In the SADC, Zimbabwean officials relied on public spin, mis-
information, closed-door Summit meetings and a relentless campaign by the lionized 
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nationalist leader, Robert Mugabe, who blocked Tribunal reappointments and wore 
down moderate governments opposed to the backlash.
In closing, we address three broader theoretical questions that arose as we con-
ducted our research and in presenting our findings: (i) why did sub-regional judges 
rule against states instead of  avoiding decisions that were likely to provoke negative 
reactions; (ii) why were sub-regional Secretariats easier for governments to control 
than sub-regional courts and (iii) were differences in judicial appointment rules part 
of  a rational plan to limit the courts’ powers?
Why did judges not anticipate, and thus avoid, provoking the backlashes? The time between 
interim and final rulings provided sub-regional judges with information about mem-
ber state preferences and an opportunity to back down from looming confrontations 
with governments. When we asked the judges why they remained unyielding in the 
face of  strident government opposition, they cited their obligation to follow the law. 
This is hardly a surprising justification, but it is also a rational and strategic response. 
If  judges are seen as caving in to political demands and ignoring the law, their author-
ity and raison d’etre may be called into question. On the other hand, expansive rulings 
create easy targets for political rebuke. This may explain the post-backlash caution 
exhibited by the ECOWAS Court and the EACJ in fashioning remedial awards to pre-
vailing private litigants.
Yet this does not explain the SADC Tribunal’s confrontational approach to 
Zimbabwe, both in the initial Campbell rulings and in subsequent contempt orders. 
The SADC Tribunal’s former president, Ariranga Pillay, is fiercely independent, and, to 
this day, he strongly defends the rightness of  the Tribunal’s decisions. The judges were 
also arguably channelling sympathy for the rule-of-law advocates in Zimbabwe as well 
as frustration with SADC political institutions, which were unwilling to call Zimbabwe 
to task for numerous violations of  the law.
Why do sub-regional judges act with greater independence in comparison to sub-regional 
Secretariats? The judges on the courts we examined, although clearly aware of  the 
limits of  their authority, displayed greater willingness to act independently than did 
Secretariat officials. Lawyers may find this unsurprising, but the reasons for this differ-
ence are worth underscoring, since political scientists and politicians often expect all 
supranational actors to be easily influenced agents of  states. First, Secretariats exist to 
facilitate member state cooperation and to promote Community objectives, tasks that 
require close collaboration with governments. Second, Secretariats are not expected 
to follow legal procedures in the scrupulous way that judges do when adjudicating 
cases. Third, Secretariat officials tend to be diplomats or individuals with national gov-
ernment experience or aspirations, while judges on Africa’s sub-regional courts come 
from, and often return to, high-level national judicial appointments. For example, 
the SADC Tribunal President Pillay was Mauritius’ chief  justice from 1996 to 2007, 
which may explain his unwillingness to brook Mugabe’s intimidation tactics.
Was the ECOWAS Court designed to be more independent, and the EACJ and the SADC 
Tribunal designed to be more vulnerable? The ECOWAS Court has a different structure 
than its sub-regional counterparts. It has an express human rights jurisdiction, 
and the member states as a group have repeatedly supported and even bolstered the 
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court’s authority. The creation of  the Judicial Council, the professional independence 
of  the Secretariat, and the rejection of  the Gambia’s backlash effort all reflect a deeper 
governmental commitment to the ECOWAS Court as an adjudicator of  human rights 
complaints.
This does not imply, however, that the analogous structures of  the courts in the 
SADC and the EAC reflect the rational design choices of  sovereignty-jealous states. 
Governments in East Africa have refrained from conferring human rights jurisdiction 
on the EACJ and regularly contest the Court’s backdoor adjudication of  human rights 
suits. And the EACJ Appellate Division – itself  a result of  the backlash – provides a 
mechanism to reverse more expansive First Instance rulings. Yet both chambers of  
the EACJ remain stubbornly independent.173 The SADC Tribunal’s fate also cannot be 
explained by rational design. The appointment procedure that Zimbabwe exploited to 
suspend the Tribunal appears to be more of  an oversight than an intentional tool for 
court curbing. And the Tribunal’s key rulings, which involved the politically incen-
diary issue of  minority white landowners, risked generating a backlash that even a 
court with more judge-friendly appointment rules may not have survived.
That international court rulings often elicit negative reactions from defending 
states is old news. Yet most of  these responses are the stuff  of  ordinary politics. A gov-
ernment that publicly criticizes judicial rulings, drags its feet in implementing a judg-
ment or only partly remedies legal violation is not engaging in a concerted backlash 
campaign to destroy the court or radically curb its powers. Nor do such actions prove 
that international court rulings, in the aggregate and over time, are unhelpful to those 
who seek to pressure governments to revise challenged laws and policies.
At some point, however, a state’s negative reaction crosses the line between ordi-
nary and extraordinary politics, creating an existential threat that requires civil soci-
ety groups, lawyers, international officials and others to mobilize to save the tribunal. 
If  and when such threats arise elsewhere in the world, the credible backlashes against 
three similarly situated sub-regional courts in Africa – and their divergent outcomes 
– will provide important guideposts. The key finding of  our research is that transpar-
ency and adherence to process limit the political space for aggrieved states to react and 
enable tribunal supporters to mobilize against court-curbing proposals.
173 Gathii, ‘Saving the Serengeti: Africa’s New International Judicial Environmentalism’, 16 Chicago Journal 
of  International Law (2016) 386.
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